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Introduction: Unambiguous 
"Thomas Pynchon is an enigma shrouded in a mystery veiled in anonymity." 
CNN, "Where's Thomas Pynchon?" 
It could make for a nice flourish to introduce early into my thesis a quote by 
Thomas Pynchon, the author himself discussing his work, perhaps through an interview 
with The Paris Review or Charlie Rose. Even better would be a quote from the author 
that, in some way, summarizes what is surely an idiosyncratic philosophy of writing. 
Such insight would provide for an initial understanding from which my thesis could then 
operate. However, such a quote would be difficult to come by as Pynchon has never 
given an interview and only three known photographs are in circulation, all of which pre-
date the publication of his first novel. Thomas Pynchon has mostly distanced himself 
from the public, yet he has simultaneously penetrated the literary imagination of the 201h 
and 21 st centuries. His entire oeuvre stands as a cornerstone to postmodern literature as 
we now know it, having inspired authors such David Foster Wallace, David Mitchell, and 
Dave Eggers. 
However, Thomas Pynchon is not entirely removed from the world. When 
Salman Rushdie, following the publication of The Satanic Verses, was threatened with a 
fatwa declared by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Pynchonjoined a fray of writers who 
wrote to Rushdie, supporting him and his work ("Words"). Also a fan of popular culture, 
Pynchon has lent his voice to two episodes of The Simpsons. In one of the more mythic 
stories, CNN tracked Pynchon down and caught him on video camera walking the streets 
of Manhattan. Before airing, however, Pynchon called the studio and asked that the film 
not be shown, stating, "Let me be unambiguous" ("Where's Thomas Pynchon?"). In 
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refusing the opportunity for someone the opportunity to speculate, Pynchon is not 
entirely absent, but neither is he at all accessible. 
Yet the absence of the author is, in some sense, entirely appropriate. His absence 
perfectly puts into practice an assumed literary aesthetic that each of his novels dutifully 
inherit. In his first novel V (l 963 ), written while he worked for Boeing as an engineer 
after serving in the Navy and graduating from Cornell with a degree in English, the 
characters seek a mysterious woman who goes only by the eponymous name of "V." That 
same year began Pynchon' s reputation as a hermit and recluse after TIME magazine sent 
a photographer to get a photo of Pynchon, who subsequently, as the story goes, hopped 
on a bus to Mexico, where he would remain for some years. The photographer, like any 
one of Pynchon's characters, was sent on a wild chase after something he would not find. 
The uncanny parallel of Pynchon' s reclusive tendencies and his plotlines is in no way 
negligible. 
Molly Hite, one of the most prolific Pynchon scholars, aptly calls the persistent 
absence of central identities within Pynchon's novels the "trope of unavailable insight" 
(121). The trope is highly idiosyncratic and, in some ways, it has come to define his 
writing. Fallowing V, Pynchon wrote The Crying of Lot 4 9 ( 1 966), which gained more 
popularity for the enigmatic author. In the novel, the main character, Oedipa Maas, seeks 
after a shadowy rogue postal firm, the Trystero. As may be expected, the Trystero never 
emerges from the shadows; characters and readers alike are denied revelation of the 
growing conspiracy. Pynchon's third (and arguably most popular) novel was Gravity's 
Rainbow (1974). At the center of the novel is a Rocket, which, like the Trystero, is 
doggedly sought after, generating numerous side-narratives and burlesque episodes, but 
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the Rocket is never found in its entirety. I could continue offering examples of this trope 
playing out in Pynchon's work, but it is not necessary as each novel follows a similar 
pattern. An avid reader of Pynchon reads his work knowing they will be denied full 
access to the mysteries at the center, but it is part of the fascination. There is something 
irresistible in the absolute denial of epiphany. 
Hite also notes how scholars and readers alike are drawn to Pynchon's 
inconclusive texts. "The novels all capitalize on a sense of insufficiency," she writes, 
"and in doing so Pynchon has effectively created a gap that most of his scholarship has 
sought to address" (121). Hite outlines three approaches to Pynchon that scholars 
typically take in analyzing the novels. "The first approach," she writes, "assumes that 
each novel does contain a central, controlling insight, but that the insight is so cunningly 
encoded in the text that it must be brought to light by an elaborate process of translation," 
which she believes to be problematic because it results in plural interpretations, all 
claiming legitimacy as the one true "Center."1 The second "claims that the novels do not 
express central insight because the insight is simply too horrible to face," which, 
according to Hite, "represent[ s] retreats from an unpalatable truth and serve[ s] to counsel 
blissful ignorance as a fitting response to a world that is 'really' either intolerably orderly 
or intolerably chaotic." The third "maintains that the novels do not express the 
unavailable insight because the insight is inexpressible. Language is inadequate to convey 
the full truth about present-day reality" (122). Hite's final suggestion for how to read 
1 Hite uses "Center" to denote a central, absolute truth. As used, it is a form of her term "Holy Center," 
which is an absolute truth with the added property ofrevelation for a character. The term "Holy Center" 
derives from Gravity's Rainbow (517). Needless to say, Hite notes that no characters ever reach the "Holy 
Center." 
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Pynchon's novels is an interesting one, but one that I will ultimately break from: 
"Because of the Holy Center, the ultimate guarantor of meaning, is unavailable in all the 
novels, all the novels occupy context in which any number of local systems of meaning 
can coexist" ( 128). It is a promising interpretation at first sight. It fits neatly into the 
postmodem theoretical context in which the novels are written-an opening up of plural 
meanings that are capable of coexisting. Further, it is well-grounded in that the Holy 
Center, or the point of epiphany and full realization (stumbling across the Rocket would 
be such a realization), is unavailable to the characters of the novels. Yet this thesis aims 
to challenge Rite's notion of unavailability. Her epistemological suggestion, which 
echoes a majority of Pynchon scholarship, proposes unavailability as parallel to unreality. 
I argue instead that the abstractions at the center of each Pynchon novel, which are 
inseparable from epiphany, are real. Just because it is not depicted or represented in its 
entirety does not mean there is not a real presence emanating from a real thing. 
Western philosophy has long valorized epistemological thought over the 
ontological. The Cartesian self ("I think therefore I am") has enjoyed a dominant position 
and is reflected in postmodem philosophy, which is well-known for questioning a reality 
that extends beyond oneself, a derivative, perhaps, of a largely human-centered 
philosophy. Whatever one does not encounter directly, its reality, through epistemology, 
can be questioned or challenged. Graham Harman notes the seemingly inveterate 
anthropocentric approach to conceptualizing the world in discussing Kant' s legacy in 
current philosophy: "[W]hat is truly characteristic of Kant's position is that the human-
world relation takes priority over all others" (The Quadruple Object 45). Though 
postmodem philosophy is nuanced, a major component of it is nicely encapsulated in 
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Lyotard's famous "incredulity towards metanarratives," or the incredulity towards truths 
and realities shared by all. Postmodemism, baring its epistemological foundations, asks 
how can someone know there are real things out in the world? Or, a more germane 
question in regards to the Cartesian self, "How can I know there are things that are 
outside of me?" The focus on epistemology dominates Pynchon scholarship, though it 
rarely announces itself as such. 
Oftentimes, Pynchon scholarship, if it looks to the entities at the center of each 
novel, reduces them to metaphors or symbols. The epistemological readings dismiss their 
reality, nullify their presence, and the entities in tum become a representation of post-war 
anxieties, American imperialism, etc. In one case, Richard Poirier, in a discussion on 
Gravity's Rainbow, suggests that the Rocket at the heart of the novel is simply a 
representational assembly of "life, love, sex, death." Poirier's declaration, while 
frustratingly broad, is representative of current scholarship. I do not mean to suggest that 
such readings are without value or even that they are inherently wrong. What I do mean 
to suggest is that there is an enormous terrain of Pynchon's works left unexplored by 
scholars, one which recognizes the legitimacy of the central entities as something real, 
and in doing so sustains an analysis of ontological uncertainty unfolding throughout each 
novel. To recognize the "legitimacy" of the central entities, which are most often 
inanimate objects, requires a system of analysis that requires less an understanding of 
objects qua humanity and more an understanding of objects qua objects. 
Martin Heidegger led perhaps one of the most pivotal advances in twentieth 
century philosophy with his landmark work Being and Time (1927). Although Heidegger 
asseverates that his topic is the title characters, the nature of objects, or "things" as he 
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sometimes refers to them, proliferates throughout. Long after Heidegger, as the twentieth 
century drew to a close, a rejuvenation of Heidegger's subtle workings of objects was 
reinvigorated by Graham Harman, who claims, "Heidegger's account of equipment gives 
birth to an ontology of objects themselves" (1 ). Harman fleshes out an "ontology of 
objects" in Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, (2002). Harman 
radicalizes Heidegger's tool analysis into an exhaustive philosophical study of the 
inherently unknowable essence of objects. As a result of his work, Object-Oriented 
Philosophy, or Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO from this point onward) was born. 
Scholars of philosophy, the humanities, political science, video game design, and a 
colorful array of other disciplines began actively participating in, and contributing to, the 
field. 
OOO is a form of speculative realism that rejects the long-standing philosophical 
tradition of anthropocentricism2 and avers that all entities share the similar characteristic 
of a sublime unknowability, an indefinable essence (here, and elsewhere, OOO breaks 
from epistemology). The philosophy itself has seen a variety of applications, ranging 
from fresh understandings of food, waste, nuclear materials, and even aliens. OOO is not 
easily compartmentalized. An especially poignant cornerstone to the philosophy, in 
regards to the current undertaking, is the notion of anti-correlationism, which rejects "the 
belief that human access sits at the center of being, organizing and regulating it like an 
ontological watchmaker" (Bogost 5). In OOO, human cognition and human existence 
(Heidegger's Dasein) lose their self-privileged status. In other words, anti-correlationism 
2 Anthropocentricism, as the name suggests, is the time-honored tradition of considering human beings as 
more significant in the scheme of existence than other types of being. 
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calls for constant critique of conclusions derived from prioritizing human consciousness 
and puts in their place conclusions that recognize the legitimacy and importance of 
thinking beyond the privileged relation of human-world. 
One prominent figure of the OOO movement, Timothy Morton, engages the 
pressing issue of global warming, coining the term "hyperobject" to describe an entity 
such as global warming that is spread thoroughly throughout space and time in relation to 
human experience. The hyperobjects most notable trait is their inaccessibility. Due to 
their massive dispersal through time and space, Morton writes, "hyperobjects are 
contradictory beasts. [ ... ] [H]yperobjects cannot be thought of as occupying a series of 
now-points 'in' time or space. They confound the social and psychic instruments we use 
to measure them" (47). Like Pynchon's central entities, hyperobjects refuse total 
comprehension and total capture. They move like a shadow along the periphery of human 
awareness. 
The hyperobject, massive in relation to human existence, is unsurprisingly 
difficult to summarize satisfactorily in one or two paragraphs. Thus, the next chapter will 
work to provide a better understanding of the hyperobject while simultaneously applying 
it to Pynchon's work in order to gain an understanding of the novels' discussions on 
objects, inanimate beings, and how humans understand and encounter the ontological 
statuses of not only themselves, but the world around them. 
Object-Oriented Ontology has yet to be applied to Pynchon in scholarly work. 
However, OOO lends itself incredibly well to the study of Pynchon, whose novels seem 
deeply concerned with the mystery and essence of objects. Instead of settling on symbol 
or metaphor, OOO calls for recognizing objects, whether real or fictitious, as objects unto 
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themselves. OOO refuses to, in the words of Graham Harman, reduce objects to 
"despicable nullities" (The Quadruple Object 5) Symptomatic of current "correlanist" 
practice within Pynchon scholarship, Richard Poirier reduces the Rocket of Gravity's 
Rainbow to a symbol of "life, love, sex, death," an abstraction imprinted on human 
consc10usness. 
Much of this thesis will further elucidate the concept of the hyperobject as it 
relates to two of Pynchon' s novels, but first I will redirect the discussion to Hite' s 
previously discussed trope of "unavailable insight." The term itself notes the human-
centered thinking in relation to Pynchon's texts: what is unavailable is unusable without 
being transformed into metaphor. But for Pynchon to sustain the dichotomy of 
unavailability and insight at the center of each novel, he offers plenty of clues, hints, and 
even direct mentions of those unavailable entities. Much of The Crying of Lot 49 consists 
of Oedipa's sifting through such signs, hoping (futilely) that they will somehow lead her 
directly to the source-the Trystero. What is especially poignant about the search is 
Oedipa's constant dilemma, as noted by Edward Mendelson. She is constantly left to 
affirm or deny the sacredness of what she sees. In using the term "sacred," Mendelson 
refers to the deity-like status of the Trystero in the context of Oedipa's quasi-religious 
quest. Either the signs Oedipa comes across are true signs of the Trystero or they are 
random signs with no inherent meaning unto themselves, an option that comes with the 
implication that all meaning is somehow derivative of her paranoid psyche. The dilemma 
is the same dilemma that this thesis addresses. Scholars suggest that The Crying of Lot 49 
is an experiential novel in that it forces the reader into the position of Oedipa, affirming 
or denying the existence of the Trystero based upon the sparse evidence available. 
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However, I would like to amend such an observation to suggest that scholars are put in a 
similar position. They, too, are left to either affirm or deny the existence of the Trystero 
based on their philosophy of accessibility, which is founded on a human-centered view of 
the world. To the epistemologically informed scholar (which, I argue, is almost each and 
every Pynchon scholar) it is impossible to say for sure whether or not the signs truly point 
to the Trystero or that the Trystero exists at all. There is no way to know for sure that 
there exists a reality beyond Oedipa's own. The world outside of individual perception 
thus narrows indefinitely until all that remains are hypothetical questions concerning 
reality. But to the ontologically focused scholar, there can exist real things, regardless of 
humankind's access to them. 
Choosing V and Gravity's Rainbow as the basis for my thesis may seem based on 
unabashed masochism. The two novels are known for being particularly dense and 
sprawling, each boasting an enormous cast of characters, an enormous reach of several 
plotlines, and Pynchon's idiosyncratic discursive/regressive narrative arc. Yet this is 
precisely the reason the two novels were chosen. At the heart of each is a central entity 
that, amazingly, holds together an incredibly tortuous narrative: the mysterious lady V. 
and the Rocket. Moreover, each of these central entities is vastly different yet uncannily 
similar to the other, allowing for an analysis that recognizes, true to the approach of 
OOO, the inherent unknowability of all objects, which, in itself, expands one's 
understanding concerning Pynchon' s work. 
In Chapter One, I discuss Gravity's Rainbow. The novel's mysterious Rocket and 
Schwarzgerat offer an excellent platform to discuss the hyperobject, its various traits, and 
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its malignant magnetism. Doing so offers a fresh perspective on some of Pynchon's 
favored motifs such as paranoia, predestination, and most importantly, connectivity. 
Chapter Two looks to V., a lesser-studied text in comparison to Gravity's 
Rainbow. In V., Pynchon most clearly deals with the dichotomy of the animate and 
inanimate world, which he further juxtaposes atop the mysterious presence of the lady V. 
Analyzing lady V. allows for an expanded commentary on how the hyperobject relates to 
the agency of both the animate and inanimate, as well as how the hyperobject contributes 
to conceptualizations of "world" as we understand it. 
While analyzing Pynchon's central entities as metaphors and symbols has proven 
fruitful in the past, the approach has removed the entities further and further away from 
any claim to reality; to quote Latour, "The question [of critical theory] was never to get 
away from facts but closer to them, not fighting empiricism but, on the contrary, 
renewing empiricism" (231 ). There still exists a vast expanse of unexplored terrain 
through analyzing the texts from an ontological viewpoint, one which looks specifically 
to the objects for their contribution to the understanding of a story. In doing so, a new 
reading of Pynchon is offered, one which explores a vast world of ontological 
connection, disruption, and dissolution. 
Chapter 1: 
Autonomy and Dissolution of "Self' in Gravity's Rainbow 
"The awful shadow of some unseen Power 
Floats though unseen among us; visiting 
This various world ... " 
-Percy Bysshe Shelley, "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty" 
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When the 1974 Pulitzer Prize committee rejected the jury's unanimous 
recommendation of Thomas Pynchon' s Gravity's Rainbow for the fiction prize, they did 
so under the impression that the novel was "turgid," "overwritten," and ultimately, 
"unreadable" ("Pulitzer"). From the perspective of literary scholar Harold Bloom, 
however, Pynchon's novels are not at all "unreadable." Instead, in an interview with The 
Paris Review, he deems them "very difficult pleasures" (Weiss). Bloom-like any avid 
reader of Pynchon-would likely cite Gravity's Rainbow as the paragon of Pynchon' s 
"difficult pleasures." The novel's timeline ranges from the latter stages of World War 
Two through the immediate post-war period. Its scope stretches geographically through 
England, France, Germany, and southwest Africa. Characters seek after a mysterious 
Rocket (serial number 00000) in all of these places, following hints, clues, and each 
other. Their reasons for seeking the Rocket are multi-faceted, but the common 
denominator is a compulsion to seek and to find the elusive entity. In tandem with the 
novel's controversial reception among the general populace and the Pulitzer committee, 
scholars immediately took to delineating the complex and interlaced narrative from 
various theoretical vantage points. 
While most scholars would likely center their interpretations of the novel on the 
mysterious Rocket (coupled with the equally mysterious Schwarzgerat), scholarship is 
divided on matters concerning the Rocket's significance. Richard Poirier offers a 
somewhat typified proclamation, "The central character is the Rocket itself, and all other 
Martinson 12 
characters, for one reason or another, are involved in a quest for it, especially for a secret 
component, the so-called Schwarzgerat." However, Poirier ultimately settles on the 
disappointingly vague conclusion that the Rocket is simply a representational assembly 
of "sex, love, life, death" (173). Similarly, exemplary scholars such as Edward 
Mendelson, Molly Hite, Dwight Eddins, and David Seed have written extensively on 
Gravity's Rainbow's sprawling cast of characters, societal and cultural themes, and 
psychoanalytical yearnings. These readings, if they look to the Rocket at all, offer a wide 
array of possible symbols for the Rocket and its Schwarzgerat. Yet the Rocket itself, 
devoid of metaphorical meaning, has remained ambiguous. Poirier' s declaration of the 
Rocket, though quite broad, is representative of current scholarship. While previous 
scholars' metaphorical and symbolical interpretations of the Rocket have proven 
interesting, I believe there is also a need to recognize the Rocket free of metaphor or 
symbolism in order to sustain a discussion on the novel's grappling with notions of 
connectivity and autonomy. However, the lack of scholarship on the Rocket itself is 
understandable. 
The Rocket is purposefully kept ever so slightly out of arm's reach from both the 
characters who seek it and the reader. As noted in the last chapter, Molly Hite has 
deemed the maneuver Pynchon's "trope of unavailable insight," which populates each of 
his novels. For example, the lady V. of V. (1963), the Trystero of The Crying of Lot 49 
(1966), corporatism in Against the Day (2004), and the Golden Fang Enterprise of 
Inherent Vice (2009) are all shadowy entities that loom constantly in the characters' 
paranoid minds, forever out of definitive reach. The Schwarzgerat is a particularly 
interesting manifestation of the trope, due to its range of significance for each character 
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who seeks it, as well as its ability to hold together a fractal plot that boasts over 400 
characters. Pynchon reveals very little about the mysterious device. The Schwarzgerat is 
a component of a V-2 rocket (the Rocket) as an insulation device, capable of containing a 
human being through launch, and constructed of the fictional plastic Imipolex G. The 
Rocket and Schwarzgerat are sought after by nearly every principal character for a wide 
array of motives. It is likely owing to the scarcity of information that the aforementioned 
scholars have devoted their attention to using what little is told about the Schwarzgerat to 
break down and analyze the motivations of the characters that seek after it, rather than 
analyzing the rocket itself. In some ways, the Rocket and Schwarzgerat become, for these 
critics, a very oblique symbol for American society in general-a de-coder ring to unlock 
the complexities of postwar psychological, spiritual, and physiological states. While their 
approach has proved interesting since the novel's release, resulting in some fascinating 
analyses, there remains much to be said concerning the Rocket qua Rocket. 
In my previous chapter, I discussed Hite's generalized analysis of the various 
approaches to Pynchon's texts. Her discussion offers a crucial insight: none of these 
approaches treat the Center as something real, beyond the characters' perception of it. 
Indeed, to make a claim of "reality" beyond individual perception about a postmodem 
text seems a special branch of heresy in that postmodem texts often relish indeterminate 
reality-such heresy seems even more scandalous in the context of a Pynchon novel. 
Moreover, to confront the Rocket and Schwarzgerat fully may be avoided simply because 
it could be seen as a fruitless endeavor, or sheer conjecture. The line of thought may 
conclude that, since Pynchon has not given us a concrete presence at the center of the 
novel, we are free-perhaps even obligated-to regard the Rocket as a metaphor in 
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understanding the inter- and intra-personal labyrinths at play in the novel. My analysis, 
however, inverts the long-standing approach to analyzing Gravity's Rainbow. Instead of 
looking at what the supposedly symbolic Rocket can tell us about the novel as a whole, 
the characters that populate the pages, and the depicted societies, I focus on what all of 
these can reveal about the Rocket's qualities and characteristics. By then observing the 
qualities and characteristics of the Rocket itself, I advocate a new approach to Pynchon, 
one which involves recognizing the legitimacy and reality of the central abstractions 
(e.g., the Rocket) and questioning the long-held postmodern practice of disavowing the 
existence of a discernible reality. A voiding claims of reality due to a lack of presence is a 
product of Western philosophy's long-standing valorization of the epistemological over 
the ontological (Harman 45). As this chapter will ultimately discuss, epistemological 
wavering on matters of reality serves only as preservation for a fictitious sense of 
subjective autonomy. 
My approach to analyzing the Rocket may at first resemble Molly Hite's first 
listed approach in the above discussion in that it claims a central, controlling insight-the 
very real existence of the Rocket and Schwarzgerat-yet it is subtly different. An object-
oriented approach will not conclude that the Rocket is a symbol of life, love, sex, and/or 
death. Instead, my approach operates according to the ontological perspective that the 
Rocket is a Rocket and the Schwarzgerat is a Schwarzgerat. Unlike previous scholars, I 
suggest that Rocket does not serve a purpose outside itself; rather, it exists and has 
importance in its own right, free of metaphor or symbol. My focus is on the properties, 
characteristics, and perceptions that will help illuminate the Rocket's pith-function within 
the novel's Byzantine plot. To analyze the Rocket effectively requires a system of 
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analysis that relies less on the traditional scope of the understanding of objects qua 
humanity and more on an understanding of objects qua objects; that is, it requires Object-
Oriented Ontology. 
Zeug and Gerat: Heidegger's Objects 
In his tool analysis of Being and Time, Heidegger offers the statement, "In the 
domain of the present analysis, the entities we shall take as our preliminary theme are 
those which show themselves in our concern with the environment" (95). While a full 
summary of the tool analysis isn't necessary for current purposes, one of the core tenets 
of Heidegger's philosophy is in the strange, metaphysical friction that exists between an 
object as present-at-hand (vorhanden) and ready-to-hand (zuhanden). Or, put more 
simply, there is friction between an object contextualized in its designated purpose and an 
object removed from its designated use, respectively. Heidegger states that, while 
ontologically explicating a thing, one must realize that those things that we encounter are 
"proximally hidden" because it is impossible to anticipate a thing's ontological character. 
He clarifies by saying that the things of his analysis "never show themselves proximally 
as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room" (98). 
Instead, what one would encounter is the room, and only through acknowledging the 
relations within can individual things then emerge. While many of these ideas were later 
transmuted and radicalized by several scholars in a variety of academic disciplines into 
the much more object-rigorous theory of OOO, the core ideas largely remain. What 
should be taken from a very brief synopsis of an exhaustive and seminal philosophical 
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work is as follows: objects withdraw into an essential nature that is entirely unavailable 
to human perception and cognition. 
As Heidegger's Being and Time was published in 1927, it is likely that Thomas 
Pynchon would have encountered it, either through his university years at Cornell (1953-
1957) or through his own, personal studies. The latter possibility could be just as likely, 
considering that many have quipped that to read Pynchon, one must have an encyclopedia 
at hand. Regardless, Pynchon's encyclopedic knowledge extends into philosophy. He 
mentions several philosophers throughout Gravity's Rainbow, including multiple 
mentions of Leibniz, Heidegger's intellectual predecessor in metaphysics and ontology. 
In a recent article, Patrick McHugh suggests that Pynchon used Heideggerian ontology as 
a meta-representation of the radicalism and cultural revolution represented in Gravity's 
Rainbow.3 This particular claim is far outside the scope of the current chapter, but it holds 
true that there are uncanny parallels between Heidegger' s ontological work and 
Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow. Specifically, there are uncanny similarities between 
Heidegger's notion of "equipment" and Pynchon's Schwarzgerat, a component of the 
Rocket itself. 
In Being and Time, Heidegger refines his use of the word "things" and opts that 
instead, "We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern 'equipment"' (97). 
Writing in German, Heidegger used the word Zeug, which, as the translators, John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, mention in a footnote, "has no precise English 
equivalent. While it may mean any implement, instrument, or tool, Heidegger uses it for 
3 McHugh, Patrick. "Cultural Politics, Postmodemism, and White Guys: Affect in Gravity's Rainbow." 
College Literature 28.2 (2001): 1. 
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the most part as a collective noun which is analogous to our relatively specific 'gear' ... 
or the still more general 'equipment'" (97). Similarly, Gerdt (of Schwarzgerat) is without 
a precise English equivalent; it can be translated as "device"-or, like Zeug, as-
"equipment," "instrument," or even "tool." Schwarzgerat (which has mostly been 
referred to as "black device" within Pynchon studies) already bears resemblance to 
Heidegger's "equipment"-both Zeug and Gerat can refer to equipment, tool, or 
instrument. In Gravity's Rainbow one main character, Enzian (a native speaker of 
German), translates Schwarzgerat for the English-speaking Slothrop as 
"Blackinstrument" (369). 
Lauded for his both overt and subtle wordplay, Pynchon seems to point to the 
ontological character of the Rocket and Schwarzgerat by means of a very subtle nod to 
Heidegger. Pynchon possesses an intimate understanding of the German language, which 
would allow for such subtle wordplay between Zeug and Gerat. His linguistic enterprise 
is noted by David Seed: "In [Gravity's Rainbow] a chain of analogies is set up which 
includes ... German state divisions, German word-formation, and even the step-gables of 
German houses" (190). To point to every example of Pynchon's play on the German 
language would prove unnecessarily exhaustive when one single passage illustrates it 
best. Tchitcherine, another character questing for the Rocket, recalls a conversation he 
had with Slothrop, which occured after Slothrop's aforementioned conversation with 
Enzian: 
Slothrop never mentioned Enzian by name, nor the Schwarzkommando. 
But he did talk about the Schwarzgerat. And he also coupled "Schwarz-" 
with some strange nouns, in the German fragments that came through. 
Martinson 18 
Blackwoman, Blackrocket, Blackdream .... The new coinages seem to be 
made unconsciously. Is there a single root, deeper than anyone has probed, 
from which Slothrop's Blackwords only appear to flower separately? Or 
has he by way of the language caught the German mania for name-giving, 
dividing the Creation finer and finer, analyzing, setting namer more 
hopelessly apart from named. (397) 
Pynchon's word-play with the German language offers some needed, preliminary insight 
about the Schwarzgerat: the name itself should not be understood as fixed. What is 
occasionally referred to as the "black device" throughout the novel could just as well be 
called the "black instrument" or, taking Heidegger's influence into consideration, "black 
equipment." What such a reading would imply for the Rocket and the Schwarzgerat is 
quite simple in the context of a previous quote from Heidegger. A thing is inherently, 
proximally hidden: "[Objects] never show themselves proximally as they are for 
themselves, so as to add up to a sum of realia and fill up a room" (Heidegger 98). The 
Rocket and Schwarzgerat are perfect manifestation of"proximally hidden" objects. 
Though their existence is documented in dossiers and reports, they remain in a constant 
state of elsewhere. As the narrator says about the workers in the factory that produced the 
Schwarzgerat, "Whatever the new device [the Schwarzgerat] was, nobody saw it" (439). 
While the analogue alone would provide for an interesting analysis of the Schwarzgerat, I 
am interested in pushing the Heideggerian analogue toward a recent concept born of 
OOO: "hyperobject." At once strikingly familiar to Heidegger's object, yet hauntingly 
different, the hyperobject offers the most chillingly accurate analogue of the elusive 
Rocket and its Schwarzgerat. 
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Pynchon's Hyperobject 
There remains the question of how to conceptualize the Rocket's "reality," which 
has likely been weighing on the mind of any postmodemism-oriented reader ever since 
my proclamation that within the novel's reality, the Rocket does exist as something real. 
The theory of the hyperobject will allow further clarification, but it will prove most 
beneficial to begin with Pynchon's given definition of unreality as understood by 
Tchitcherine, the Russian half-brother of Enzian: "The only tipoffto its unreality is ... 
the radical-though-plausible-violation-of-reality" (718). Such a definition plays an odd 
role in the novel, in part because the characters seem to have diverse and vacillating 
opinions on whether or not the Rocket is real. Instead, what should be taken away is the 
operative term "violation-of-reality." 
In the opening pages to The Quadruple Object (2011), Graham Harman addresses 
the need to treat objects as objects, whether real or fictitious: "All such objects must be 
accounted for by ontology, not merely denounced or reduced to despicable nullities .... 
My point is not that all objects are equally real, but that they are equally objects. It is only 
in a wider theory that accounts for the real and unreal alike that pixies, nymphs, and 
utopias must be treated in the same terms as sailboats and atoms" (5). Fiction or fact, an 
object must be treated as an object to avoid the danger present in qualifying ontological 
existence. In Tool-Being, Harman discusses the inherent danger of ontic prejudice 
implicit in a theory of substance: "The notion of a natural substance makes illicit use of 
our ontic biases to draw a supposed ontological distinction between substance and non-
substance. . .. [T]he mistake lies in holding that the substance has to be a natural 
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ultimate point" (277). To read Gravity's Rainbow via the lens of OOO means to treat the 
Rocket-which some critics may refer to as a violation-of-reality, a variegated illusion in 
the characters' consciousness-as an object in its own right. To treat something as 
elusive as the Rocket as something goes firmly against what Dwight Eddins calls the 
"postmodem privileging of indeterminacy" (119). It is precisely such indeterminacy that 
has led scholars instead to look to what the Schwarzgerat symbolizes, as opposed to what 
it is or even accepting the concept that it is something at all. Morton suggests that 
postmodem theory's tendency to treat everything as a metaphor not only does injustice to 
individual things, but is also misleading: "[T]here are real things for sure, just not as we 
know them or knew them" (4). The equivocation of what is real is a byproduct of 
postmodem epistemology, encased in the simple question, "'How can I know there are 
(or are not) real things?"' (Morton 9). OOO boldly asserts that we do know. Harman, 
writing on Heidegger's concept of Dasein (the being of humankind), states, "The fact 
that Dasein never arrives at an 'essential identity' does not mean that there is none" 
(185), a distinction echoed by Slothrop's thought that "just cause you can't see it doesn't 
mean it's not there!" (Pynchon 690). There are real things, and often, a "trace of 
unreality" is a paradoxical indication of them. In looking to the ontological character of 
the Rocket and forfeiting the hedged security of epistemology, a new Rocket emerges as 
part of a new text, one which severely threatens the notion of the autonomous self in a 
highly connected world. 
The manner by which one can begin to note the essential identity of the 
Schwarzgerat is by recognizing its function as a hyperobject. Morton notes the uncanny 
way in which hyperobjects emerge as realities: "Immediate, intimate symptoms of 
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hyperobjects are vivid and often painful, yet they carry with them a trace of unreality .... 
The threat of unreality is the very sign ofreality itself' (Morton 28, 32). For the 
characters who seek the Rocket, it's the threat of unreality that draws them closer. In its 
refusal to be found, it suggests an actively evasive presence, perhaps summed up by 
Slothrop in his fear of a "Presence so large that nobody else can see it" (244). The 
hyperobject can be noted by its various effects, yet never seen in its entirety. In 
Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World (2013), Morton begins 
by broadly defininigng the term hyperobject as "things that are massively distributed in 
time and space relative to humans .... Hyperobjects are not just collections, systems, or 
assemblages of other objects. They are objects in their own right" (1-2). While partaking 
of the essential withdrawn nature found in everyday objects (a hallmark of Heidegger-
inspired OOO), the hyperobject distinguishes itself through its massive distribution and 
massive effects. Morton offers some examples of hyperobjects in order to show how 
diverse they can be: nuclear materials on Earth, global warming, capitalism, and the solar 
system. In all of these examples, the common denominator that serves as the foundation 
for hyperobjects is that we are always, in some irreducible way, inside of them, never 
escaping their influence. Both Harman and Morton would agree that just because a 
hyperobject is never touched or seen in its entirety does not mean that it is not real. In 
fact, such a situation would only be further evidence that what is in question is, indeed, a 
hyperobject. To map the existence of such a hyperobject, one need only look at its 
effects. To look at the hyperobject's effects, however, first requires an understanding of 
its characteristics according to Morton's taxonomy: viscosity, nonlocality, phasing, 
interobjectivity, and temporal undulation. 
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The characters' induction into the Rocket conspiracy marks perhaps the most 
illuminating quality of the hyperobject: viscosity-becoming aware of the existence of the 
hyperobject entails an increased awareness of one's presence within its structure. Morton 
states, "The more I know about global warming, the more I realize how pervasive it is. 
The more I discover about evolution, the more I realize how my entire physical being is 
caught in its meshwork. ... The more I struggle to understand hyperobjects, the more I 
discover that I am stuck to them" (28). The hyperobject's viscosity then refers to its 
uncanny characteristic of mass entanglement. There is no way to ever be "free" of global 
warming, to exist in a space or time outside of it, because one is constantly inside of it. 
The viscosity of the hyperobject results in an increasing awareness of its looming 
presence, as well as awareness of how the individual is enveloped and active within its 
viscous presence. The most salient example of the hyperobject's viscosity in regards to 
the Rocket is its function within the novel as a whole. Joseph Slade writes that to discuss 
Gravity's Rainbow is complicated by the mere fact that "everything [in the novel] is 
about connectedness: Pynchon has created a universe in which everything is related to 
everything else" (159). The common denominator in the connectedness or the unifying 
presence that is able to achieve such an interlacing of plot is the Rocket. The person 
tracing these connections is largely the main character, Slothrop. It could be argued that 
the novel is in some ways a gradual progression of Slothrop's ever-heightening 
awareness of how enmeshed he (and everyone else) truly is with the Rocket. When he 
finds the dossier to Laszlo Jamf, a scientist, Slothrop uncovers his own connection to the 
Rocket and the Schwarzgerat. As it turns out, Slothrop was sold as an infant to IG 
Farben, the manufacturer of Imipolex G-the material used to construct the 
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Schwarzgerat. As Slothrop reads through the papers, he begins to see just how enmeshed 
he truly is with the Schwarzgerat: "[Slothrop] knows that what's haunting him will prove 
to be the smell oflmipolex G" (291). From that moment on, Slothrop's primary purpose 
is to locate the mysterious device. As his quest becomes increasingly complicated by 
other Rocket-seekers and by side-tracked Quixotic adventures, he begins seeing the 
malevolent ubiquity of the Rocket's Schwarzgerat: "[H]e knows as well as he has to that 
it's the S-Gerat after all that's following him, it and the pale plastic ubiquity of Laszlo 
Jamf. That if he's been seeker and sought, well, he's also baited and bait" (498). 
After Slothrop is made aware of the mysterious Rocket, he begins to see how it 
affects not just the world around him, but also himself as an individual. Moreover, 
Slothrop's increasing paranoia (as he realizes how enmeshed he is with the Schwarzgerat) 
leads him to a self-defeating conclusion: "The Schwarzgerat is no Grail, Ace, that's not 
what the G in Imipolex G stands for. And you are no knightly hero ... you know that in 
some irreducible way it's an evil game" (3 70). In a moment of self-defeat or self-
awareness, Slothrop comes to the realization that the Schwarzgerat is "no Grail." While 
he possesses some understanding that he will not find the Rocket and the Schwarzgerat in 
their entirety, he continues in his quest regardless. Moreover, he understands that, in 
searching for it, he puts himself in some position ofunnamable danger, an evil game. 
Menahem Paz suggests, "Slothrop follows the trail of the rocket mainly because it is the 
only lead he has, and perhaps because subconsciously he feels that this might prove 
personally rewarding" (200). The question remains as to why his search would be 
personally rewarding. Paz suggests that the answer has something to do with working 
through Slothrop's past with the Schwarzgerat, but I would complement his interpretation 
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by suggesting that Slothrop has an inveterate need to seek the Schwarzgerat, a need 
which began the moment, while looking through Jamf's dossier, he was made privy to its 
existence. The foreboding knowledge that Slothrop won't ever find the Rocket is not 
enough to discourage him from the search. Would someone ask a climatologist who 
encounters the hyperobject of global warming why they pursue global warming when 
they can never see it in its entirety? In the face of imminent failure and even danger, he 
continues seeking precisely because he knows it exists, thereby revealing an initial 
property of the Rocket-though absent throughout the novel, its existence is made 
manifest in its similar effect upon all seeking characters. All the characters are caught in 
the viscous fabric of the hyperobject, irrevocably drawn further into its ephemeral 
mystery. 
Many other characters besides Slothrop are engaged in a similar quest for the 
Schwarzgerat with a similar persistence. While some are questing after the Schwarzgerat 
for martial or political reasons, others seek simply to find. Slothrop's need to find the 
Schwarzgerat is also found in many of these characters who are seeking the Schwarzgerat 
for reasons that they themselves may not be fully aware of. In other words, Slothrop is 
not the only character caught in the viscosity of the hyperobject. Joshua Pederson, writing 
on Pynchon's common theme of the preterite and the elect (or, those who are passed over 
by God and those who are "chosen"), states, "[T]he gravitational pull of the preterite 
attracts all who seek to escape it, and all, it seems, eventually become members of the 
'passed over'" (147). What demarcates the preterite and elect in the novel is proximity to 
the Rocket. Dwight Eddins notes, "The blurring of the distinction between the preterite 
and the elect in a natural communion ... traps both groups in a sterile alternative of 
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victimhood and oppression" (115). Both Eddins' and Pederson's classification of who, in 
the novel, are elect or preterite is centered on who is closest to the rocket conspiracy-
those who are closest to the conspiracy are considered the elect, and those, like Slothrop, 
who are seeking the root of the conspiracy, are the preterite. But these divides are 
constantly in flux. As Pederson notes, the "elect" characters often fall from their 
privileged status, and find themselves questing alongside the preterite. One key example 
of the leveling from elect to preterite is seen in the case of Pirate Prentice. During war-
time, he was employed through PISCES to manage the fantasies of higher-ups in the 
military, so that these high-ranking officials could better focus their attention to the war 
effort. However, after the war, PISCES loses funding and Prentice is released from his 
duties. No longer an "elect," no longer a part of the possible conspiracy, Prentice and 
others begin searching for the truth, thus becoming preterite. Thus, the viscosity of the 
hyperobject encompasses all who become aware of it, echoing Morton's statement, "We 
find ourselves caught in [hyperobjects]" (32). The only difference between the two camps 
is that the preterite seek rather blindly while the elect are closer to the truth, not through 
having some inexplicable access to the hyperobject itself, but through knowing more 
about it and having a better understanding of how deep the conspiracy runs. Just like the 
preterites, however, the elect come no closer to finding the actual Rocket and 
Schwarzgerat. The impotence of both the preterite and the elect's quest does not give 
credence to the Rocket's "unreality." Instead, it signals the Rocket's nonlocality. 
In a position analogous to Slothrop's, the main character of The Crying of Lot 49 
(the novel preceding Gravity's Rainbow), Oedipa Mass, must seek out a recondite 
presence-the Tristero, a shadowy system of postal carriers. Though their operation 
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seems to branch everywhere, the actual centralized operation is nowhere to be found, 
regardless of the many signs that she follows. Oedipa's predicament is described in this 
way: "Suppose, God, there really was a Tristero then and that she had come on it by 
accident. ... [S]he might have found the Tristero anywhere in her Republic, through any 
of a hundred lightly-concealed entranceways, a hundred alienations, if only she'd looked" 
(179). Her fear, rational or irrational, is that if she gives up looking, she will never know, 
while simultaneously, she may be working her way further and further into a fantasy. 
Writing on the same passage, Edward Mendelson, suggests that, in the recondite presence 
of a central agent around which the plot revolves, "the simple becomes complex, 
responsibility becomes not isolated but universal, the guilty locus turns out to be 
everywhere, and individual clues are unimportant because neither clues nor deduction can 
lead to the solution" ("Sacred" 123). The impossibility of coming to a solution arises 
because the Trystero, as with the Schwarzgerat, is paradoxically everywhere while also 
nowhere at all, exhibiting its effects from whatever remote, or intimately close, distance. 
The Trystero clearly operates around Oedipa-she can see its signs all around her. 
However, she cannot find them anywhere. The apparent paradox is explained in the 
hyperobject's nonlocality, a term that Morton borrows from quantum theory, which 
proved that separate particles were able to signal information (a directional spin) faster 
than the speed oflight at any given distance (Morton 42). One particle could exhibit a 
physical effect through a remote distance. Morton notes that the quantum example of 
nonlocality does not apply to all hyperobjects. Instead, he writes, "The action at a 
distance that hyperobjects manifest is nonlocal, but not in the quantum sense" (44). The 
hyperobject is able to affect natural discourse greatly without being "present" in the 
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normal sense of the word. Morton clarifies his distinction with an analogy: if you are 
feeling raindrops, what you are experiencing is climate, and one could equally say that 
you are experiencing some discursive effect of climate change, "but you are never 
directly experiencing global warming as such" ( 48). You can experience global 
warming's effect on rain, on temperature, etc., but global warming itself, an entity unto 
itself, is impossible to experience in full. In effect, nonlocality as applied to a theory of 
hyperobjects, means that a hyperobject "cannot be thought as occupying a series of now-
points 'in' time or space ... there is no such thing, at a deep level, as the local" ( 4 7). 
Global warming, much like the Rocket, is hauntingly real, yet it is impossible to 
experience as any local presence. It is far too distributed across continuums of 
experience. 
Scott Drake notes the Schwarzgerat's strange ability to unify a discursive 
narrative from a remote location: "The rocket functions as an overarching structure that 
attempts to supersede the inherent value of the digressive narrative lines to which it is 
attached in order to direct [the characters] back toward its own image and thereby 
establish its centrality in the novel" (237). Drake approaches a theory of the rocket itself 
as something whose effects are nonlocal, but he ultimately concludes that the rocket's 
ontological status, in the novel, remains uncertain. But there remains something to be said 
for Drake's acknowledgment that the rocket seems to possess a strange ability to order 
and direct all discursive plot-lines back to itself; however, I would argue the process of 
connection is impossible. Luc Herman and Petrus van Ewijk write, "[E]ven though 
reading Gravity's Rainbow might induce the feeling of completeness, its seemingly 
unending connections also deconstruct that idea. The intimation of infinity hurts the 
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shallow belief in neat totality .... The result does not necessarily have to be chaos, but 
Pynchon certainly presents the reader with a hopeless task and thus undoes any dreams of 
wholeness" (173). The "hopeless task" is, of course, purposefully analogous to the 
characters' very own task-to connect the moving pieces of a moving conspiracy. Or, to 
put it another way, they must trace the connections between themselves and the 
conspiracy. The novel's quest is a self-reflexive act-the conspiracy is never presented as 
if it exists in a vacuum. The conspiracy deeply threatens the individual who seeks to get 
to the bottom of it, creating the central conflict at play in the novel-the impossibility of 
resolving the Rocket-conflict posed against each individual; in other words, if the 
individual does not find the Rocket, the conspiracy continues indefinitely, ultimately 
threatening her most basic assumptions concerning her existence. 
At one point in the novel, Narrisch, a bumbling rocket technician, involved with 
the creation of the Schwarzgerat and the 00000, thinks back on all that has occurred since 
those days as he is hounded by Russians in search for the Rocket, "Did the S-Gerat 
program at Nordhausen in its time ever hint that so many individuals, nations, firms, 
communities of interest would come after the fact?" (525). Just as nonlocality refers both 
to time and space, so does the Schwarzgerat exhibit its effects through both. Enzian, 
leader of the Schwarzkommando, troubles himself with the question of how far back the 
origin to the Rocket plot goes: 
"We have to look for power sources here, and distribution networks we 
were never taught. ... Up here, on the surface ... syntheses were always 
phony, dummy functions to hide the real, the planetary mission yes 
perhaps centuries in the unrolling .... And if it isn't exactly Jamf 
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Olfabriken Werke? what if it's the Krupp works in Essen, what if it's 
Blohm & Voss right here in Hamburg or another make-believe 'ruin,' in 
another city? Another country?" (530) 
The view of technology as expanding outward into shadowy, corporate connections has 
been connected by scholars to the crux of the Rocket-conspiracy. The Rocket's 
geopolitical origins, some would argue, contribute to its mystique. Joseph Slade writes 
that the conspiracy of Gravity's Rainbow, analogous with the "They" who are constantly 
at blame by the paranoid characters, "is cosmic, its reach virtually unlimited, its most 
discernible components the huge corporations and cartels .... These organizations, multi-
national and therefore supra-national, ignore geographical and political boundaries; 
accountable to no one government, they circumvent the laws of all nations, and operate as 
states themselves" (161). While his interpretation is fairly straight-forward, I would 
advocate a slightly different reading for the task at hand. Enzian demonstrates a paranoia 
that concerns the Rocket's capacity to influence. More than the political quagmire the 
Rocket introduces, it also denotes an impossible return to a single point of origin. 
Enzian's quest to trace the Rocket, to trace how it affects him and the people he leads, is 
then problematized dramatically. Thus, the air of existential melancholy in Enzian's 
passage is not negligible. He is aware of losing something, though he can't be entirely 
sure what it is. He steadily becomes aware of the fact that it exists far beyond any reach 
that he is capable of, but still he continues searching. 
Slothrop reaches a similar revelation of the Rocket's ambiguous origin and 
realizes that the production of the Rocket involved German, Swiss, English, and 
American factions before and during the war. In the words of Menahem Paz, "There are, 
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[Slothrop] believes, 'Elect' people who clandestinely combine to run the multinational 
megacorporations, effectively dominating the entire word .... [They] make crucial 
decisions about war, about the course of scientific development, and the direction of the 
world economy" (207). The binary of the preterite-Elect is distinguished by locality and 
the agency that locality affords. Those who are able to control across a distance of time or 
space are considered Elect, whereas those immediately involved in the consequences of 
such decisions, however unknowingly, comprise the preterite. With a slightly altered 
understanding of the preterite and Elect in mind, the Rocket itself acts as the ultimate 
Elect, a hyper-Elect perhaps. It is a shadowy presence that greatly affects the discourse of 
the novel, yet it is entirely unseen. It is the prime-mover of each character, each 
digression. Moreover, it takes on an air of frightening mobility, unseen influence, and a 
far-reaching origin, both geographically and chronologically. How then can it continue to 
draw characters in its wake in lieu of a unified, local presence in the narrative? This is, in 
some ways, the pivotal question concerning the hyperobject. How can it be known if it is 
inherently unknowable? Such a phenomenon can be explained by the hyperobject's 
property of phasing. 
Paranoia, a deeply rooted theme in Pynchon's oeuvre and particularly exemplified 
in Gravity's Rainbow, shares with the concept of phasing what could well be considered 
a cause-and-effect relationship. David Seed, writes on peculiar paranoia that is 
emboldened through Gravity's Rainbow's sheer repetition and recurrence: 
These recurrences generate an anxiety in the reader by hinting at more 
connection than can actually be formed .... Moments of discovery are crucial in 
Gravity's Rainbow because they appear to be the epiphanous confirmation of 
Martinson 31 
these paranoid fears .... The reader gradually becomes aware of a lattice of 
intersections between these plots which does not grant an over-view but does at 
least remind him of the inadequacy of any one means of explanation (207-209). 
As discussed previously, the manner in which the characters are connected is primarily 
through the Rocket (again, I use "Rocket" to signify the 00000 and the S-Gerat). Just as 
they are connected through their quest for the Rocket, they are connected through the 
paranoia that results from their failing quest. Pynchon's use of paranoia is certainly of 
interest to a discussion on the hyperobject's phasing, which Morton defines: 
"[Hyperobjects] occupy a high-dimensional phase space that makes them impossible to 
see as a whole on a regular three-dimensional human-scale basis .... We only see 
snapshots of what is actually a very complex plot of a super complex set of algorithms 
executing themselves in a high-dimensional phase space" (70). In other words, human 
access allows us only very crude representations of a much larger whole, a much larger 
hyperobject that supersedes its three-dimensional caricature. 
With an understanding of the hyperobject's phasing in mind, paranoia serves a 
beneficial purpose; it is particularly attuned to phased representations of a larger, unseen 
whole. The paranoiac is hyper-observant of the phased effects-the signs of the 
hyperobject-and tries to assemble them into a larger, understandable totality. Thomas 
Schaub points out that Pynchon's employment of paranoia "becomes a metaphor for the 
difficulty of knowing from the inside whether or not a set of events constitutes a designed 
plot or is merely coincidental" (The Voice of Ambiguity 105). A liminal understanding of 
the plot-at-large is common to all Pynchon's characters undertaking paranoiac quests 
while "inside" the "set of events." At one point in Gravity's Rainbow, Roger Mexico and 
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Pirate Prentice discuss their preterite status as pitted against the unknowable "They," 
from whom the entire Rocket conspiracy (even the war) supposedly originates. Likely 
echoing the thoughts of all characters involved in the widespread conspiracy, Prentice 
tells a paranoid Roger, "We don't have to worry about questions ofreal or unreal. They 
only talk out of expediency. It's the system that matters. How the data arrange themselves 
inside it. Some are consistent, others fall apart" ( 651 ). The binary of data 
consistency/falling apart implies something larger from which the data derives. Prentice 
justly notes that it is the system that matters, a catch-all for a much larger-something that 
is at work. There is something that the data, the representations, and the events are 
coming from. 
Yet the true paranoiac of the novel is, of course, Slothrop. Menahem Paz notes 
that, for Slothrop, there are two possibilities concerning the plot in which he has found 
himself: there is a deterministic Elect who dictate the actions of the preterite without 
revealing themselves, or there is total randomness. Paz synthesizes Slothrop's 
dichotomous fears in the form of Chaos Theory, suggesting that there is a connection 
between events, but that the connection is highly unpredictable and uncontrollable (208). 
A similar sentiment is echoed by the narrator, who graciously offers a lucid, operative 
definition of paranoia: "[I]t is nothing less than the onset, the leading edge, of the 
discovery that everything is connected, everything in the Creation ... " (717). Keeping in 
mind Chaos Theory, paranoia in the novel is an attempt to gain access to the connections 
between events in order to gain control. Yet the connections and signs that the characters 
are trying to make sense of are not perfect manifestations of the Rocket-they are phased 
representations. To echo the tenets of Chaos theory, there is a connection, but the 
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connection is unpredictable and intensely difficult to control. The very idea that 
everything is connected would imply that, after connecting the events, a larger picture 
emerges, which is precisely what a hyperobject does; it is the way in which the 
hyperobject is conceivable. Its pieces, fragments, and representations constantly surround 
us. However, to put them all together into a single mosaic of clarity and absolute 
presence is impossible because we simply do not exist alongside the hyperobject. The 
hyperobject occupies a dimension beyond ours. We receive only translations of the 
hyperobject; the result of connecting these translations is a highly speculative, likely 
inaccurate, portraiture. Or to use yet another characteristic of the hyperobject, connecting 
all the spiraling pieces is impossible due to the interobjectivity of the hyperobject. 
The hyperobject's effects, as noted, are nonlocal. They occur both everywhere 
and nowhere. But the way in which the hyperobject is experienced is best explained 
through the trait of interobjectivity: "Hyperobjects provide great examples of 
interobjectivity-namely, the way in which nothing is ever experienced directly, but only 
as mediated through other entities in some shared sensual space" (Morton 86). 
Interobjectivity is closely related to causality-how objects affect other objects and other 
entities as a part of a given assemblage. Yet the causality is not seamless and does not 
lead to absolute clarity in regards to what is behind all of the branching causality. Morton 
writes, "[Interobjectivity] does not allow for perfect, lossless transmission of information, 
but is instead full of gaps and absences" (83). The reason for these gaps and absences is 
owing to the nature of the hyperobject. One simply cannot use the causal marks of the 
hyperobject to find the hyperobject because "The appearance of things, the indexical 
signs ... is the past of the hyperobject" (90). In the same way that Slothrop's Puritan 
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ancestors sought "Data behind which always, nearer or further, was the numinous 
certainty of God" (245), so do the questing characters try (and fail) to trace the Rocket's 
"footprints" to a definite presence. However, the impotence in the quest does not exclude 
an awareness of the Rocket's existence, even if its existence is difficult to conceptualize: 
"It was impossible not to think of the Rocket without thinking of ... growing toward a 
shape predestined and perhaps a little otherworldly" (422). They see signs of the Rocket 
conspiracy and scramble to order the signs into a coherent-perhaps otherworldly-
shape, but they will forever be left with only these signs of the Rocket, a limitation hinted 
by the narrator as follows: "[I]f it all does grow toward some end shape, those who are 
here inside can't see it" (546). The Rocket exists, yet its existence is seen only as 
fragmented throughout the winding narrative. Bits and pieces are scattered liberally 
throughout, yet the central Rocket, the sought after and quested for, is not found because 
it exists beyond the narrative in a dimension not recognized by those who seek it. 
Not only are the Rocket's effects nonlocal, but the object itself is nonlocal. It 
occupies a dimension beyond the strictly human, encompassing a time and a space that 
warps perceptions of it. To further complicate their ill-fated pursuit, the questing 
characters are enmeshed with the Rockets' past signs, gaps, and absences. Yet the reader 
must perform a similar task along with the characters. Dwight Eddins, writing on the 
narrative form of Gravity's Rainbow, states that the novel "is a dauntingly intricate web 
of reciprocities, ironic correspondences, inversions and unexpected doublings, one effect 
of which is to disorient us from our linear, simplistic mappings of experience" (109-110). 
In a sense, the novel advocates for a reader-paranoia alongside the questing characters' 
paranoia. Reader-paranoia results from trying to get to the truth from an obstructed 
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viewpoint that, in the words of Lance Olsen, "seeks to undermine the modernist paradigm 
of narrative and epistemological constructions ... [the reader] must live in a state of 
paranoia" (83). Again, the narrative of Pynchon's central entities intersects neatly with 
the narrative of the hyperobjects. The hyperobject, shrouded beneath an index of signs, 
dead ends, and spiraling connections, is surely real. Its phased effects surround the 
narrative of the world. Its past permeates thought through causal relations. However, its 
strange presence-its dichotomy of here and not-here-either results in an 
epistemological claim that it does not exist, or it tears us from our "simplistic mappings 
of experience." Of course, I would declare it is the latter. The hyperobject demands that 
we think differently about our perceptions of all things, not just the hyperobject. The 
Rocket forces the characters to confront the seeming unreality of their own existence in 
tandem with something as withdrawn as the Rocket with statements such as, "presence 
back on Earth is only temporary, and never 'real"' (737). All assumptions, 
epistemological and ontological, are thrown into limbo by the Rocket and its bizarre, 
inaccessible existence. The Rocket, just like the hyperobject, calls into question the 
media through which the characters perceive and experience their existence, even through 
something as fundamental as space and time. 
The Rocket's effects on space and time are best noted by Enzian, the marginalized 
leader of the Schwarzkommando (the black Rocket troops) and the Erdschweinhole (a 
group ofHerero's from Southwest Africa). The Rocket becomes a religion for his people. 
His primary goal throughout the novel is to reassemble a replica of the 00000, 
Schwarzgerat included. As Enzian reflects on the Rocket's apotheosis, the narrator writes 
of the inherent motivation, 
Martinson 36 
What Enzian wants to create will have no history. It will never need a 
design change. Time, as time is known to the other nations, will wither 
away inside this new one. The Erdschweinhole will not be bound, like the 
Rocket, to time. The people will find the Center again, the Center without 
time, the journey without hysteresis. (323) 
Enzian's reflections on the Rocket led to Dwight Eddins' reading that the Rocket 
"symbolizes a constant metaphysical rebellion" against the law of gravity, or more 
simply, that the Rocket symbolizes a potential stasis of the divine, free from the effects of 
entropy or chaos. He goes on to say that Enzian's projection of his desire onto the Rocket 
is an analogue desire to attain the Holy Center, as discussed earlier on. While I would 
agree with Eddins that it is, indeed, Enzian's desire, his reading tells us very little about 
the Rocket itself, free of projection; however, it does introduces a theme that runs 
rampant throughout the novel-time, more specifically, space-time. When Eddins notes 
that the Rocket symbolizes a stasis, a potential infinite existence at the peak of the 
Rocket's parabola, he is noting Pynchon's idea of time as something capable of 
malleability. In one instance that demonstrates the novel's play with space-time relativity, 
a briefly featured character connected to the S-Gerat discusses "a common aerodynamic 
effect" which involves "our own boundary layer and the shape of the orifice as we pass 
it," which leads a gainsayer to heckle her: "Oh you mean that before we get to it .. .it's a 
different shape?" (750). 
Pynchon seems to suggest here that his central abstractions, the 00000 and S-
Gerat, are not at all fixed entities. Thus, their space-time cannot be seen as permanent and 
fixed. Morton refers to this concept as the temporal undulation of the hyperobject, hinted 
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at in his broad definition of the hyperobject as something "massively distributed across 
space-time" (3). Related to the theory ofrelativity, temporal undulation keeps the 
hyperobject's appearance in constant flux. Morton writes, "Relativity is what guarantees 
that objects are never as they seem, and not because they are ideas in my head-but 
because they aren't .... Spacetime isn't an empty box, but rather an undulating force 
field that emanates from objects. Now the thing about undulating temporality is that it 
really is measurably obvious in hyperobects, objects that are massive from a human 
standpoint" (64). He goes on to qualify his claim by offering examples tom from basic 
illuminations of the theory of relativity; namely, flying a space shuttle and telling a 
different time from a slower moving plane below at the exact same "moment" ( 65). The 
implication of temporal undulation is that hyperobjects "allow us to see that there is 
somethingfutural about objects as such" (67). A hyperobject such as nuclear materials on 
earth force us to confront the sheer longevity of their existence relative to our own. Their 
distribution across time is far greater than any human individual's, thus warping 
preconceptions regarding their temporality. The Rocket creates a similar effect for those 
who are exposed, in some way, to its presence. Greta Erdmann, a German film actress in 
the novel and one of Slothrop's many lovers, recounts the Rocket controlled by 
Weismann/Blicero, the man who commanded the original 00000 Rocket battery: "It was 
not Germany he moved through. It was his own space .... My cunt swelled with blood at 
the danger, the chances for annihilation, delicious never knowing when it would come 
down because the space and time were Blicero's own" (494). Erdmann makes the 
mistake of conflating Blicero with the Rocket in suggesting that "space and time" were 
his own. Her account typifies an anthropocentric outlook in stripping the Rocket of its 
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agency in saying the Rocket's effects are in some way due to Blicero. However, even in 
her correlationist observation, she notes an important aspect of the Rocket. In and of 
itself, it greatly affects notions of space and time, complementing Enzian's view that the 
Rocket is an extension of space and time in and of itself. Also, importantly, the Rocket's 
"chances for annihilation" are in tandem with its existence outside of fixed space-time. It 
is here that one encounters perhaps the most important aspect of the hyperobject-a 
connotation of destruction. The destruction the hyperobject and the Rocket suggest goes 
beyond what one would associate with a Rocket. Besides the physical annihilation that 
the Rocket inevitably brings, it also causes annihilation on a deeply ontological level. 
I have noted previously that Timothy Morton's paradigmatic example of the 
hyperobject is Global Warming. Throughout Hyperobjects, Morton does what I have 
done with Gravity's Rainbow: he shows how global warming fits his criteria for what a 
hyperobject is and does. But Morton also offers broader insight into why hyperobjects 
need to be recognized as such: 
Hyperobjects force us into intimacy with our own death (because they are 
toxic), with others (because everyone is affected by them), and with the 
future (because they are massively distributed in time). Attuning ourselves 
to the intimacy that hyperobjects demand is not easy .... Once we become 
aware of the long-term effects ofhyperobjects, we cannot abolish this 
awareness, and so it corrodes our ability to make firm decisions in the 
present. ( 13 9-140) 
While Morton emphasizes the dire need to re-think ecological problems in relation to 
Global Warming, the "intimacy" under discussion is inherent in all hyperobjects, not just 
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Global Warming. As in the case of the Rocket, though never stated, its presence 
ostensibly stretches into the future. The quest in which the characters are engaged could 
likely continue without their frantic search bringing them any closer to the Rocket. The 
quest would continue much as it does through the novel-finding only past signs of the 
Rocket and those who are also seeking. Thus, the search for the hyperobject Rocket does 
not reveal the Rocket; instead, it reveals its massiveness and the mass of connections that 
the Rocket unifies. Understanding the Rocket as a hyperobject introduces an entirely new 
dimension to the notion of Slothrop's "quest" as well as the hyperobject's "intimacy with 
death"-the preservation of a dissolving "self' in a massive web of connections. 
The Malignant Reality of the Rocket 
The Rocket is a magnetic presence in the novel, attracting the characters much 
like moths to a flame-all names and places are somehow linked to its looming shadow. 
But as the metaphor of a flame suggests, its deterministic agency, its viscous presence 
that brings both the Elect and the preterite near, is fatal. At the end of his quest, Slothrop 
stands as the prime example of the fatal agency of the hyperobject; he begins to disappear 
and disintegrate, quite literally. As the disintegration occurs, the narrator addresses 
Slothrop directly: 
"Temporal bandwidth" is the width of your present, your now . ... The 
more you dwell in the past and in the future, the thicker your bandwidth, 
the more solid your persona. But the narrower your sense of Now, the 
more tenuous you are. It may get to where you're having trouble 
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remembering what you were doing five minutes ago, or even-as Slothrop 
now-what you're doing here. (517) 
Slothrop is presented with a paradoxical situation: to maintain his persona, he must 
situate himself in the past and/or the future; however, losing a sense of the present results 
in a rarefaction of his presence. It is understandable then that by the end of the novel, 
Slothrop is gone entirely into what Dwight Eddins aptly calls a "dispiriting limbo" (119). 
Slothrop's persona, his "self," dissipates and dissolves entirely. 
It should not be forgotten that at the point in the novel when Slothrop's persona 
begins to wane, he is still very much seeking after the Rocket as he has been throughout a 
majority of the novel. His decisions, it seems, have been informed entirely by his search. 
In a sense, the hyperobject corrodes one's ability to "make firm decisions in the present" 
in part because the awareness of the hyperobject is a sort of solipsism-Slothrop sees 
how he is affected and how he is involved. He was born into the Rocket conspiracy, at 
each "present" moment in the novel he was consumed in a search for the Rocket, and his 
future, as a result, is bleak. The influence of the hyperobject crosses demarcations of 
time, and more importantly, crosses artificial demarcations that separate the self from the 
outside world. Ultimately, Slothrop loses personhood and becomes a figure of Zone 
folklore and an archetype of the fatal quest: 
There is also the story about Tyrone Slothrop, who was sent into the Zone 
to be present at his own assembly-perhaps, heavily paranoid voices have 
whispered, his time 's assembly . ... He is being broken down instead and 
scattered. (emphasis in original, 752) 
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Slothrop's disintegrated presence at first bears striking resemblance to the hyperobject. 
Indeed, in the strictest sense, Slothrop has become "massively distributed" through space-
time. All that is left of Slothrop are phased representations: "Some believe that fragments 
of Slothrop have grown into consistent personae of their own" (757). The fragmented 
Slothrop bears specific resemblance to the Rocket, which itself was fragmented in order 
to keep it hidden. It is here that we encounter a strange pass in the novel: Slothrop takes 
on characteristics of the hyperobject he seeks. However, I would argue that he has not 
become a hyperobject unto himself because he remains Slothrop, a being that, through 
reassembly, could still be seen in his entirety. Instead, he has only become another 
component of the Rocket. He has been subsumed into the Rocket's viscous fabric 
entirely. 
The strange ending for the novel's main character has puzzled readers and divided 
scholars. Tony Tanner suggests that Slothrop's disappearance is yet another affirmation 
of the fate that awaits the preterite of the novel-they are cast aside, or "thrown 
overboard," at the caprice of the System (54). His interpretation, in its focus on the 
banishment of preterite characters, overlooks the significance of the uncanny 
resemblance between the disintegrated Slothrop and the Rocket. Slothrop was not cast 
aside. He was brought in. In Heideggerian terminology, Slothrop becomes as "proximally 
hidden" as the Schwarzgerat. His very reality comes into question, much as the reality of 
the Rocket, the Schwarzgerat, and the Elect are in question throughout the narrative. 
Seaman Bodine, a friend of Slothrop, is described as "one of the few who can still see 
Slothrop as any sort of integral creature any more. Most of the others gave up long ago 
trying to hold him together, even as a concept" (755). Slothrop entered the same, 
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shadowy plane of the Rocket-he has become an abstract concept, a chimera of the Zone, 
a possible hoax. Pynchon's narrator anticipates the parallel by writing, "It's doubtful if he 
[Slothrop] can ever be 'found' again, in the conventional sense of 'positively identified 
and detained"' (726). The operative term "conventional" would suggest a more 
unconventional sense of "found," which indeed is the approach that this chapter has 
advocated-existence cannot be dismissed simply because it is never "positively 
identified and detained." The philosophical traditions that prioritize the sense of 
conventional "finding" reflect previously discussed Pynchon scholarship that treats the 
Rocket as an illusory figure, metaphor, and symbol. Object-Oriented Ontology 
demonstrates that, as seen with the hyperobject, the inability for one to identify and 
detain is an identifying feature of reality itself. 
In searching for the Rocket, Slothrop has, by the end of the novel, lost himself. 
Just as Morton states that awareness of the hyperobject hampers our abilities to make 
firm decisions, Slothrop could not help himself from chasing after the Schwarzgerat, 
although he knew it "was no Grail." The search for the Schwarzgerat was, at its very 
core, a search to see how entangled he (Slothrop) was with the Rocket. The uncanny 
realization that he was very much involved with the past, present, and future of the 
Rocket. The impulse to search then becomes an ironic attempt to retain the "self '-the 
more Slothrop comes to understand about the Schwarzgerat, the more his sense of self 
wanes until he dissolves into an inchoate state. 
In a way, dealing with the hyperobject forces one to recognize that there is no 
such thing as the unaffected individual. In the words of Morton, "[W]e are always inside 
an object .... [E]very decision we make is in some sense related to hyperobjects" (17-
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20). Decisions about whether or not to use a plastic or paper grocery bag relate directly 
to, and are made "inside," Global Warming. The concept of the individual constantly 
functioning within the multi-faceted influence of unseen forces is the core of each 
Pynchon novel. Gravity's Rainbow shares and intersects with the narrative of the 
hyperobject. Questioning (or otherwise ignoring) the existence of the Rocket then 
exposes subjective modes of self-preservation to be found in epistemological 
indeterminacy. The logic could run as follows: if it does not exist, the individual (the 
Cartesian self) remains unaffected and free to continue existing simply through thinking. 
But to read Pynchon through OOO, and to read his central abstractions as hyperobjects is 
to confront the true conflict at the core of each Pynchon novel-connections severely 
threaten the sense of the free, autonomous, and unaffected individual. The hyperobject 
ceaselessly confronts the individual with an ontological web of interconnectedness. Its 
viscosity promises only to draw the observer further and further into its meshwork, until 
one realizes that "every decision we make is in some sense related to the hyperobject" 
(20). The individual is then subsumed into a global network and the epistemological 
concept of "self' slips further and further away until, as in the case of Slothrop, it 
disappears entirely. 
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Chapter 2: 
Ontological Uncertainty and the Agency of the Inanimate in V. 
"What an amusing world it still is, where things and people can be found in places where they do not 
belong." 
-Thomas Pynchon, V. 
Although one could potentially criticize Thomas Pynchon's debut novel V. (1963) 
for its jagged plot-lines, manic-to-introspective tone, and one-dimensional characters, the 
New York Times heralded it as "a brilliant and turbulent novel" (Plimpton). Serving as the 
foundation of a long and successful literary career, V. allows readers an interesting 
glimpse into the development of a style that would later become Pynchon's stamp on 
American literature. The novel contains the same devices that his entire oeuvre would 
later build on-a tortuous narrative, a conspiracy, an inaccessible entity at the center of 
everything, and thwarted epiphany for characters and readers alike. The main character, 
Benny Profane, finds himself in the middle of a conspiracy that centers on the elusive 
"lady V." The conspiracy involves long and winding flashbacks to Malta during World 
War II, journal entries, international spies, a transgender priest, and alligators in the 
sewer of New York City. While Profane is unknowingly pulled into the conspiracy, 
Stencil, an amateur sleuth who inherited the search for V. from his father, directly 
engages in the quest. Like the Trystero of The Crying of Lot 49 (1969) or the Rocket of 
Gravity's Rainbow, it is V. that holds the novel's spiraling plots together. However, V.'s 
hold on the narrative is much more tenuous than the central entities of Pynchon's future 
novels, in part because V. is not easily conceptualized as something. While the evidence 
supposedly points to V. as a woman, Pynchon allows her to remain ambiguous: some 
characters suggest that V. is actually a boat off the coast of Malta, others suggest she is a 
sewer rat, and those who claim she is a woman are further divided between two women: 
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Victoria Wren and Vera Mondaugen. The effect is an extremely chaotic narrative with 
more questions than answers. Such an effect would likely be considered experiential: 
while the reader is left in a constant flux of conflicting evidence, the characters also 
follow a trail of questions. But the motivation behind their search is equally mysterious, 
even to them. 
While V.'s identity is an interesting quandary I will discuss at length later on, I 
will, for the time being, refer to V. often as a woman, in part because the characters 
largely do the same. I would like to note early on that I am not going to implicitly or 
explicitly suggest an objectification of women, as perhaps could be anticipated in light of 
an object-oriented focus. Object-oriented ontologists are quick to note that the use of the 
term "object" is not used in tandem of an implied "subject."4 Instead, the object-oriented 
ontology (OOO) theorist is concerned with the inherent "unknowability" and relations of 
all things-objects, humans, nonhumans, etc.-and rejects "the claims that human 
experience rests at the center of philosophy, and that things can be understood by how 
they appear to us. In place of science alone, OOO uses speculation to characterize how 
objects exist and interact" ("What is Object Oriented Ontology?" Bogost). However, V. 
does seem to invite a discussion on objectification. Benny Profane, the bumbling, 
misogynistic main character, sees women largely as inanimate objects, which has led to 
insightful feminist criticism on the novel. Mary Allen, for example, focuses on the 
"blankness" of the women in the novel, including V.: "V. herself is nothing more than a 
4 Ian Bogost writes in his book Alien Phenomenology that he prefers the term "unit" in place of"object" 
when writing on OOO because, "object implies a subject, and the marriage of of subject and object sits at 
the heart of correlationism .... [T]he problem lies in the assumption that one subject-the human subject-
is of interest or import" (23). 
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'fetish-construction' ... [that] Man will always search for, without ever knowing why" 
(43). I will delve more fully into the problem ofV. as strictly object, but first I would like 
to explore Allen's idea of characters seeking V. "without ever knowing why," as her 
observation does, I believe, reveal something essential about V. 
The question of motivation, as Mary Allen notes, is perhaps the biggest question a 
reader of V. faces: why do these characters seek after V.? This article will suggest that 
characters seek after V. due to their assumptions that V. is passive, a trait assumed to be 
inherent to femininity and inanimateness. In trying to locate her, the questing characters 
seek affirmation that they, as men, hold a superior position in an ontological taxonomy of 
"being." However, they do not realize that they are engaged in a quest for a 
hyperobject-one whose presence poses a serious threat to their ontological convictions. 
Previous scholars have also been concerned about the question of the characters' 
motivation. Richard Patteson offers an insightful primer for studying "structure and 
certitude" in the novel. He notes that Stencil faces a decision similar to many other 
Pynchon characters: there is either something or there is nothing, the latter signifying a 
chaotic, entropic universe, perhaps more terrifying than a malevolent "something" (31 ). 
Patteson describes a constant "block of information pertaining to V." He notes that the 
characters' inability to gain full access to V. "is of some significance, because Pynchon 
expresses the epistemological aspects of his theme chiefly through the narrative 
technique and the manipulation of plot" (31 ). I believe that Patteson is correct to say that 
Pynchon incorporates "epistemological aspects" in the text, and I would further agree that 
it is largely accomplished by a chaotic narrative that incorporates and juxtaposes 
conflicting accounts of who or what V. really is, but I will deviate from his reading in 
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order to shed light on the matter of V. 's reality. In discussing Stencil's father's search for 
V., Patteson notes, "Herbert Stencil's search for V. is a quest for both knowledge and a 
kind of pattern or connection. The two are closely related, if not identical, because 
knowledge itself cannot exist without form. Formlessness implies meaningless, as 
Pynchon knows" (30). Aside from his somewhat hedged implication, Patteson echoes an 
epistemological outlook on the correlation between knowledge and patterns, or 
knowledge and visible evidence. Without the presence of objective evidence, knowledge 
cannot be said to exist, resulting in what Pynchon's main character of Bleeding Edge 
(2013) refers to as "the epistemological bug" (433). A Cartesian scholar, without sure 
pattern or connection, then dismisses the question ofV.'s reality. 
Kenneth Kupsch, in a rather daring article, demonstrates a refreshing attitude 
towards the novel and, more broadly, the epistemological tendency of postmodern 
scholars to waver on matters ofreality. Engaged in a discussion on V.'s identity, he 
states, "It is my contention that there is a knowable, unequivocal, and essentially 
irrefutable answer to the question, and that far from releasing the reader from any further 
obligation to the work, knowing that answer heightens one's obligation to it" (428). 
While his statement encapsulates a bold ontological position, he claims that he knows 
who or what V. actually is: "many of the crucial references merely point the way; like 
Stencil, readers must be willing to do their own legwork" ( 429). Though I would agree 
that the novel is, in some ways, an experiential detective novel for a reader, his reading 
confines V. to the status of an identifiable thing/symbol/reference, and his methodology 
includes breaking the narrative apart chronologically. He ultimately suggests that V. 's 
identity differs in each important section. For Kupsch, V. is, respectively, "Astarte, 
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Aphrodite, Venus, Christ," and "Victoria Wren." Kupsch, much like the characters who 
seek after her, approached V. as though she were easily contained in a specific word, a 
name, a place in time. 
Conversely, some scholars approach the novel from a position of reduction. 
According to Edward Mendelson, the novel centers on a single idea, and the entire 
discursive structure is simply an elaboration of said idea. Mendelson writes that the novel 
centers on "the decline of the animate into the inanimate" (6). Indeed, the dichotomy of 
animate/inanimate runs throughout the novel. Benny Profane has a keen awareness for 
the inanimate world, in part because he believes that he is victimized by inanimate 
objects, a belief that he affirms each time he trips over an object or is hit by debris. After 
he is almost hit by a car, "[Benny] reflected that here was another inanimate object that 
had nearly killed him," and the narrator describes him as "somebody who lies back and 
takes it from objects" (17, 314). The tension of the animate and the inanimate runs 
throughout the novel, inviting an inquiry into the novel's representation of object 
relations, as well as how these object relations inform an understanding of the identity of 
V., free of a projection of metaphor or symbol. Throughout this article, I reverse the 
traditional approach to Pynchon's novels: instead of discussing what the mysterious 
entities can tell us about the characters who seek after them, I will discuss what the 
characters can tell us of the entities. Before looking into the identity of V., however, it is 
important to look to the overarching structure into which V. falls. Throughout the novel, 
the animate world and the inanimate world interpolate, allowing for an alternative 
reading of the central tension and, ultimately, for V. herself. 
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Mendelson's summary of the novel in terms of the animate declining into 
inanimateness is likely not intended to suggest Pynchon's interest in the ontological 
qualities or traits of objects. Instead, it would seem that Mendelson suggests an 
alternative motif of entropy, or, the process by which a system degrades into chaos. In the 
context of the animate and inanimate worlds, entropy becomes a visible process, or at 
least more easily conceptualized as the inanimate world overrunning the animate. In V, 
the inanimate is even given a voice to narrate this process of entropy. When Benny 
Profane gets a job working security for the aptly named Anthroresearch Associates, he 
has the opportunity to converse, literally, face-to-face with the inanimate. One of their 
projects is SHOCK and SHROUD, which stand for, respectively, "synthetic human 
object, casualty kinematics" and "synthetic human, radiation output determined" (309). 
Both are a sort of test-track dummy, each designed to measure effects of different bodily 
traumas. Profane, noting the uncanny anthropomorphic qualities of SHROUD, designed 
to absorb radiation, starts a conversation with it/him: 
. ] 
"What's it like," he [Profane] said. 
Better than you have it. 
"Wha." 
Wha yourself. Me and SHOCK are what you and everybody will be someday[ .. 
"You don't even have a soul. How can you talk?" 
Since when did you ever have one? [ ... ] 
"What do you mean, we'll be like you and SHOCK someday? You mean dead?" 
Am I dead? Ifl am then that's what I mean. 
"If you aren't then what are you?" 
Nearly what you are. (311-312). 
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SHROUD notes immediately, without much provocation, the impending entropy of the 
entire human race. Moreover, he suggests that the process is self-induced. Benny's 
reaction exemplifies an attitude of ontic prejudice, or an implicit assumption of 
ontological superiority over the inanimate. He mentions the lack of a soul in the object, 
which could be referred to as a clear divide between the animate and the inanimate. 
However, SHROUD's responses to Profane highlight the inevitability of a communion 
between the animate and inanimate worlds, a coming together. The barrier of ontic 
prejudice is severely trivialized by SHROUD. To him, there may be differences, but they 
share in a common direction-a leveling of sorts that would make the animate equal to 
the inanimate. 
Jane Bennett, in her book Vibrant Matter (2010), lays the claim that the animate 
and the inanimate share a common "vibrancy." In a discourse ranging from the scientific 
to the philosophical, Bennett disperses vibrancy (i.e., Dasein) across ontic boundaries, 
closing the divide between human and nonhuman actors in order to demonstrate "the 
degree to which people, animals, artifacts, technologies, and elemental forces share 
powers and operate in dissonant conjunction with each other" (Bennett 34). Both humans 
and nonhumans, she says, possess agency. Moreover, she says, "The association of 
matter with passivity still haunts us today" (65). Bennett uses the illuminating term 
"thing-power" to think "beyond the life-matter binary," which otherwise suggests that 
inanimate objects possess no agency whatsoever (20). Essentially, Bennett argues that the 
life-matter binary has caused us to overlook the agency of nonhuman actors and the way 
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in which nonhuman agents assemble and function whether or not there is intentionality 
behind the outcome. To explain the different ways of conceptualizing thing-power, 
Bennett writes, "The desire of the craftsperson to see what a metal can do, rather than the 
desire of the scientist to know what a metal is, enabled the former to discern a life in 
metal and thus, eventually, to collaborate more productively with it" (60). Thus, the 
breaking down of the life-matter binary is a breaking down of the animate-inanimate 
binary, as well. In the context of OOO, the life-matter binary is inherently 
anthropocentric, suggesting a sharp ontological divide between life and everything else. 
However, the same life-matter ontic prejudice is seen in Pynchon scholarship in a 
statement such as "decline of animate into inanimate," which implicitly suggests an 
ontological de-valuing in moving from animate to inanimate. 
Bennett's challenge of the life-matter binary is echoed in the exchange between 
Benny and SHROUD. SHROUD points to the similarities between him and Benny, as 
well as the movement of humankind towards inanimateness (note: not a decline). With 
Bennett's challenge in mind, Mendelson'sjudgment summary of V. is problematized. His 
anthropocentric interpretation of "decline" suggests a taxonomical fall from grace. But he 
is not alone in his ontological assumption. Dwight Eddins notes a similar movement from 
the animate and inanimate in V. by calling it a novel that is "clearly dedicated to the 
depiction of degeneration, entropic and otherwise" (52). The ontic prejudice wrought by 
modes of epistemology has clearly held influence on the way scholars interpret 
fundamental themes of the novel, as seen in the language used to describe a shift from 
animate to inanimate. I would like to postulate a different approach to analyzing 
Pynchon's V. The entire novel seems to advocate for realignment of ontological 
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assumptions, leveling the animate and inanimate in matters of both taxonomy and 
agency, ultimately resulting in a flat ontology. 
In his book Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (2002), Manuel Delanda 
coins the term "flat ontology," which, as Levi Bryant notes, "rejects any ontology of 
transcendence or presence that privileges one sort of entity as the origin of all others and 
as fully present to itself' ("The Four Theses"). Importantly, "flat ontology refuses to 
privilege the subject-object" and it "argues that all entities are on equal ontological 
footing and that no entity, whether artificial or natural, symbolic or physical, possesses 
greater ontological dignity than other objects" ("The Four Theses"). Echoing Bennett's 
material approach to the life-matter binary, Bryant, in his interpretation of Delanda, lays 
out what is at the heart of OOO: a flat ontology where nothing is granted more 
ontological importance than something else. The principles of a flat ontology reveal what 
I argue is truly at work in V: a steady confrontation with ontological uncertainty in the 
face of the recognizably inanimate. I discern two levels on which the conflict plays out: 
Benny Profane and his constant struggle with the inanimate world and V., the mysterious 
hyperobject at the heart of the novel. 
Profane and Passivity 
For Benny Profane, "inanimate objects and he could not live in peace" (32). 
Profane's fascination with and fear of the inanimate is in some ways directly correlated to 
misogyny. Indeed, in his mind, the inanimate is equated, if not synonymous, with the 
feminine. For Profane, a man is "Master of the inanimate. But a schlemihl, that was 
hardly a man: somebody who lies back and takes it from objects, like any passive 
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woman" (314 ). Benny considers himself a schlemihl, thereby explaining his aversion to 
the inanimate. His logic runs as follows: to come face to face with the inanimate, to fall 
below the level of "master of the inanimate," results in a fall from masculinity and into 
femininity; a fall from masculinity, as he sees it, is a movement of ontological decline. 
It is unsurprising then that the novel has received insightful feminist readings that 
praise the novel's depiction of"the way(s) in which Man, masculinity, and maleness are 
also social constructions that shape, and are shaped by, the feminine" (Hawthorne 74). 
Even a lauding scholar, however, calls the means by which the effect is achieved, "at 
times nai.Ve, uninformed, or even crude" (75). Mary Allen discerns the constant evolution 
of male identity in the novel, shifting around various female presences, lady V. 
notwithstanding. Understanding the way in which Pynchon works to define certain roles 
is helpful in application to the binary between animate-inanimate. Taking into 
consideration Profane's syllogism between the inanimate and the feminine, one could 
conclude that in the same way maleness is shaped by the feminine, so is the animate-
from Profane's perspective-shaped by the inanimate. As we work towards an 
understanding of the two in a flat ontology, we arrive, momentarily, at a pass in which 
the two are at the very least mutually constitutive: the inanimate/animate binary intersects 
with the feminine/masculine binary. 
The animate and the inanimate world of V work to shape each other greatly. 
Constantly, the narrative employs incredibly pointed metaphors, illustrating the 
dissolution between the animate-inanimate binary by drawing a comparison of the two-
for instance, "The party, as if it were inanimate after all, unwound like a clock's 
mainspring" (47). But one metaphor is particularly germane. Benny remembers a story he 
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heard once about a boy "born with a gold screw where his navel should have been" (34). 
He wants to get rid of it and finally he is able to. After taking it out, he falls apart. The 
narrator writes, "To Profane, alone in the street, it would always seem maybe he was 
looking for something too to make the fact of his own disassembly plausible as that of 
any machine" (35). In a passage that eerily foreshadows the dissipation of Slothrop's 
personhood in Gravity's Rainbow, Profane's ontological anxiety is given new dimension. 
Not only does he disdain passivity to objects, but he also fears the precariousness of 
human/animate existence. He would rather fall apart due to discernible decay than 
through death itself. 
In light of Profane's existential despair, his interaction with SHOCK and 
SHROUD makes a good deal more sense. He comes face to face with an inanimate object 
that embodies all that he fears. Not only could Profane become passive to the object, but 
the object delivers a reminder of Profane's species' impending extinction. However, I 
would like to suggest an alternative and complementary reading for the interaction 
between SHROUD and Profane. Instead of seeing the discussion simply as an ominous 
moment of a robot warning Profane of humankind's follies with dangerous technology, I 
think something of equal importance is also occurring. Profane experiences an 
ontological crisis where questions of being, which had steadily become more and more 
precarious, are suddenly thrown into complete flux. It suddenly becomes very clear what 
Profane's fears re-direct to: flat ontology, a sudden equalization of the animate and 
inanimate, a stripping away of humankind's exceptionalism and a realization of the 
agency of the inanimate. 
Martinson 55 
The movement of the animate to inanimateness in the novel has been noted by 
scholars, but it has been identified as entropy, or gradual movement towards chaos. As I 
argued earlier, the conflation of a rising inanimate with "decline" is a display of ontic 
prejudice and assumptions of animate superiority. However, the parallel of chaos with the 
inanimate reflects Profane's anxiety in regards to a leveling of ontological agency in the 
novel. According to David Seed, one of the novel's conspiracies is that Profane believes 
(rationally or irrationally) that inanimate objects are out to get him, which he then calls "a 
comic version of the paranoia we meet repeatedly in the historical sections [of V.]" (73). 
Seed describes the paranoia as "comic" because, in his view, Profane's identification as a 
schlemihl and his interactions with inanimate objects demonstrates his attempts "to 
minimize his own humanity and reduce himself to an amoeba-like passivity" (73). Seed 
demonstrates the assumption that inanimateness equals passivity, perhaps because 
Profane himself makes such an assumption. Ultimately, Seed suggests that, because of 
his anxiety about becoming inanimate and passive, Profane represents "atrophied 
humanity" (75). Seed's quote of course harkens back to Mendelson's suggestion of a 
"decline of the animate" and demonstrates an equal attitude of anthropocentricism; the 
anthropocentricism hinges on the notion of "decline" or any other connotation affixed to 
a more general concept of ontological movement. 
The movement in the novel is not one of decline; rather, it is a movement towards 
ontological equivalence and recognition of inanimate vibrancy. Bennett writes of 
"vibrancy" in matter: "Humans encounter a world in which nonhuman materialities have 
power, a power that the 'bourgeois I,' with its pretensions to autonomy, denies" (16). In 
V., however, the characters are no longer able to deny the agency of the inanimate. 
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Instead of objects falling far into the background of V., they are foregrounded. The 
human characters that encounter them see themselves poised against these inanimate 
objects, inexplicably threatened by them. They take on an agency that, in effect, forces 
the animate humans to evaluate their ontological existence, their sense of "being" in the 
world. It is not only Benny Profane who encounters the inanimate world. One character, 
Fausto, writes sweeping journal entries that detail the ruins of Malta following World 
War I. In them, he notes to a reader, "Observe the predominance of human attributes 
applied to the animate" (375). Later in the novel, a man discussing the V. conspiracy 
similarly observes an instance of anthropomorphism: "The inert universe may have a 
quality we can call logic. But logic is a human attribute after all; so even at that it's a 
misnomer" (538). His statement highlights the correlationist attitude of Profane's fear of 
the inanimate world: if the binary between animate and inanimate does not mark a 
taxonomy of importance, what are the implications for a schlemihl like Profane, who 
already sees himself as worth little in the grand scheme of humanity? The question can be 
more fully explored in an analysis of the mysterious V., the hyperobject at the center of 
the novel. 
V., the Objectified Hyperobject 
Along with forcing humankind into a state of ontological uncertainty, the 
inanimate oftentimes enters into a framework of relations as actors in and of themselves. 
Jane Bennett notes an example in the case of a citywide blackout: the inanimate (in its 
sudden refusal to operate and bringing a city to a halt) is at once apparent as an actor in 
human affairs (21 ). In the case of the novel, the inanimate accounts for the central 
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conflict and tension: an equalizing movement of the animate and inanimate. Writing on 
the geographical or spatial implications of a flat ontology, Marston et al. suggest systems 
of the animate-inanimate "where the dynamic properties of matter produce a multiplicity 
of complex relations and singularities that sometimes lead to the creation of new, unique 
events and entities" ( 422). When ontological value or weight is correctly perceived as 
evenly distributed, the inanimate emerges as much a prime mover as the animate. Bennett 
poses an important philosophical hypothesis regarding agency: 
[B]odies enhance their power in or as a heterogeneous assemblage. What 
this suggests for the concept of agency is that the efficacy or effectivity to 
which that term has traditionally referred becomes distributed across an 
ontologically heterogeneous field, rather than being a capacity localized in 
a human body or in a collective produced (only) by human efforts. (23) 
An example of the inanimate's agency can be found in the hyperobject. Its massive 
power physically, spatially, and temporally is derivative of its network of inanimate 
actors that possess agency unto themselves. Yet the sum of these inanimate actors does 
not account for the hyperobject in full. According to Morton, "Hyperobjects are not just 
collections, systems, or assemblages of other objects. They are objects in their own right" 
(2). Morton is not suggesting that hyperobjects do not consist of various systems and 
networks; instead, he warns against the reductive viewpoint that sees them as only a sum 
of networks or systems. It is an important distinction to make as V. herself embodies both 
terms. I argue that she does incorporate a network of entities, but that she is also, above 
all else, a hyperobject. 
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Morton writes, "Hyperobjects are agents. They are indeed more than a little 
demonic, in the sense that they appear to straddle worlds and times" (29). His statement 
serves as an uncanny description of V. as well. David Cowart writes that V. is "a 
mysterious woman whose dark and bloody career parallels the dark and bloody unfolding 
of the twentieth century. V. seems intimately involved with the century's violence and 
bloodshed, gravitating naturally to its wars and sieges" (13). The parallel between the 
hyperobject and V., already quite uncanny, only becomes further solidified in looking at 
how the scholars treat V. While some, like Kupsch, become too confident in their 
delineations of exactly what and where the object is, others dismiss the object's existence 
entirely based upon its unavailability. For example, David Cowart writes ofV.'s role in 
the novel: 
The 'conspiracy,' along with the illusion ofV.'s agency as shaper and 
influencer of history, no doubt begins and ends in Stencil's paranoia, but 
the woman herself, the compelling symbol of a culture that has destroyed 
itself with violence and drifted into dissolution and triviality, cannot be 
dismissed so easily. V. personifies the forces that have sapped the vitality 
of modem man and made of them a 'Sick Crew.' She is figuratively the 
mother of this generation. (15) 
Cowart then suggests that V. is literally the mother of Stencil, though very little in the 
novel supports this claim. What is odd in Cowart' s passage is how he reduces V. 's 
agency. He replaces agency with concessions of symbolism and personification. V. 
cannot be a real "shaper and influencer of history," because she does not make herself 
available to the human actors in the novel. 
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Stencil, as he seeks V. desperately, cannot find her. In his idiosyncratic third-
person speech, Stencil worries over the possibility of finding her multiple times: 
She's yielded him only the poor skeleton of a dossier. Most of what he 
has is inference. He doesn't know who she is, nor what she is. He's trying 
to find out. ( 164) 
What this mission was, however, came no clearer to him than the ultimate 
shape of his V-structure-no clearer, indeed, than why he should have 
begun pursuit of V. in the first place. (244) 
Stencil wrestles as well with V.'s agency, while ironically displaying it quite well. He 
does not understand why he seeks V., but he does so anyway. It consumes him. V.'s 
agency, like the agency of the hyperobject, establishes itself deep on the consciousness of 
those who become aware of it. One of these characters-Stencil's father-writes in his 
journal, "There is more behind and inside V. than any of us had suspected" ( 49). Stencil's 
father's observation of V. aptly summarizes Pynchon's narrative maneuvers throughout 
the novel. There is no narrowing of information; in fact, it is quite the opposite. The 
narrative is flooded with information pertaining to V., some of which is contradictory to 
other information. Again, the flux of information has led some scholars to read V. as a 
metaphor, a signifier of chaos; however, I argue that the oft contradictory evidence is a 
very important detail pertaining to V.' s reality as will later be discussed. 
It would prove exhausting and tedious to point to every hint, clue, or passing 
description of who V. is, what V. is, or if V. is at all. Instead, I would like to zero in on 
some overarching themes concerning V. In a general sense, there are two unchanging 
characteristics of the mysterious V.: V. brings about a sense of death while also exerting 
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sensuality. The narrator notes, "[Stencil] tried to tell himself meeting V. and dying were 
separate and unconnected for Sidney [Stencil's father]" (428). One reason why Stencil 
continues in his quest, as well as those who preceded him, is owing to V. 's sexuality. In 
one narrative, V. is thought to be a young girl, a dancer turned prostitute. One man 
discusses her sexuality by saying, "The girl functions as a mirror. You, that waiter, the 
chiffonnier in the next empty street she turns into .... You will see the reflection of a 
ghost" (443), while later she is referred to as "not real but an object of pleasure" (449). 
Underneath the sexist notion of woman as unmediated object of pleasure, there is an 
underlying movement through her sexuality towards a literal inanimate state. 
Later in the same section, the narrator states that V. is "aware of her own 
progression towards inanimateness" ( 455). While her depicted awareness could, of 
course, refer to the pressure placed on her to become passive, such a reading is 
complicated by her physical transformation to inanimateness. For instance, Stencil fears, 
in an episode of doubt, that the entire V. conspiracy will "add up only to the recurrence of 
an initial and a few dead objects" (494). Later, a character says that V. has "an obsession 
with bodily incorporating bits of inert matter" such as a clock-iris eye and a "star 
sapphire sewn into her navel" (542). The latter detail eerily echoes Profane's story about 
the man with the screw through his navel, calling for a similar insight: through 
incorporating the inanimate, V. transforms herself into a system of animate and inanimate 
agents-an assemblage of materials of equal ontological weight that exert a powerful, yet 
deadly pull on the characters. 
V. joins the seemingly disparate parts of death and sensuality. She herself 
subscribes to the thought that "the act of love and the act of death are one" ( 456). The 
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bridging between the two seems also to serve as the pull on the characters to quest after 
her, bringing to mind a passage in which a characters states, "a latent sense of death 
always heightens the pleasure of such an involvement" (100). But, more than 
incorporating both a "latent sense of death" as well as inanimate sexuality, these two 
components-death and sexuality-are mutually constitutive in their effect on the 
questing characters: they prove tantalizing. Jane Bennett notes Mario Perniola's "sex 
appeal of the inorganic" during a discussion on the vibrancy of materiality: "This neutral 
sexuality draws human bodies to apparently dead things-to objects, stones, bits of 
matter. ... The 'sex appeal' of the inorganic, like a life, is another way to give voice to 
what I think of as a shimmering, potentially violent vitality intrinsic to matter" ( 61 ). The 
ability of the inorganic to adopt sexual characteristic results from a human' s attitude of 
the inanimate blankness or "neutrality." The "sex appeal of the inorganic" could provide 
an interesting parallel to the aforementioned fetish constructions of feminist criticism; 
however, more germane to the task-at-hand, another possibility opens up in the 
hyperobject that complements past feminist criticism. Timothy Morton suggests the 
hyperobject provides an "intimacy with death," due to its massive span in relation to 
humankind; the hyperobject's effects and its existence greatly outlasting that of an 
individual human or even humanity as a species. In a sense, the hyperobject forces 
individuals into the position of realizing their ephemeral existence. The aura of 
sensuality, however, is new to the hyperobject under consideration in the current article. 
Though scholars have noted that the Rocket of Gravity's Rainbow (which acts as much as 
a hyperobject as does V.) in some way embodies sexuality due to its phallic nature, the 
sexual property is retrospective and, at its core, correlationist. It is one thing for the 
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hyperobject itself to embody sexuality; it is quite another for an observer or character to 
project the same sexuality onto the hyperobject much in the same way metaphors and 
symbols are projected onto the hyperobject. More than a projection, I argue that the aura 
of sexuality that surrounds V. is very much an irreducible product ofV.'s status as 
hyperobject. 
Feminist approaches to V. have been particularly interested in the role of men in 
pursuing V ., Profane included. Mary Allen notes that the novel epitomizes the idea that, 
"Men now project a kind of horrible blankness of the age onto the image of women" (79), 
which again highlights the artificiality of Profane's parallel between masculinity and 
animateness or femininity and inanimateness. His association in either case is an example 
of synthetic correlationism, drawing a relation where there is none, which is inevitably a 
byproduct of what you could consider to be a sort of "ontological solipsism." But because 
he cannot step outside his correlationist mindset, his fear of becoming an object is 
inextricably linked to a loss of masculinity. His correlationist attitude, while particularly 
neurotic, is shared by other questing characters. The narrator says, as Stencil worries 
himself over the V. conspiracy: 
It did bring up, however, an interesting note of sexual ambiguity. What a 
joke if at the end of this hunt he came face to face with himself afflicted 
by a kind of soul-transvestism. How the Crew would laugh and laugh. 
Truthfully he didn't know what sex V. might be, nor even what genus and 
species. [ ... ] V. might be no more a she than a sailing vessel or a nation" 
(244). 
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What is of most interest in the passage is the immediate acceptance of the inaccessibility 
ofV. While Stencil is willing to concede that he can't be sure what V. is, he quickly 
acknowledges that V. could very well be an inanimate object. The possibility embodies 
the same attitude of Profane: In the taxonomies of genders and species and objects-men 
are animate and everything else is inanimate and feminized (e.g., the ship, which some 
characters suggest is in fact V., referred to as a "she")-a clear binary is observed. Thus, 
in seeking V ., both Profane and Stencil believe they are seeking a sexualized, passive, 
feminized, and inanimate being. Stencil himself notes to Benny Profane, "Not even as if 
[V.] were any cause, any agent. She was only there" (428-9). Moreover, actively 
searching for an inanimate being, passive in nature, will affirm for them their 
masculinity, which is inseparable from receiving affirmation that they are, indeed, 
animate. They are, indeed, special in the ontological scheme. V ., to them, serves as a 
missing link in an ontological framework. To prove their superiority in an ontological 
taxonomy, they must find V. 
The characters are mistaken, of course. Their correlationist viewpoint (which, 
here, is closely tied to misogyny) relies upon the parallel between inanimateness and 
passivity. Jane Bennett notes, "The association of matter with passivity still haunts us 
today ... weakening our discernment of the force of things" (65). Pynchon scholars such 
as David Cowart exemplify this association between objects and passivity in his 
discussion of Profane's fears: "It sums up Profane's belief that objects are in conspiracy 
against him, a comic version of the paranoia we meet repeatedly in the historical sections . 
. . . His drift into and out of such episodes resembles a cartoon or stylized comedy where 
the audience is freed to laugh by the distancing absurdity of events" (73). Cowart is 
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hesitant to assign any agency to the objects, opting instead to suggest that Profane's 
paranoia is entirely unfounded, even comic in its absurdity. Yet an unfounded paranoia 
does not account for Profane's interaction with SHROUD or indeed with Stencil's 
interactions with V. After all, V. is anything but passive or absurd throughout the novel. 
Though inaccessible to the characters, V. is in many ways the author of the quest. All of 
the novel's spiraling narratives are related, however obliquely, to V. And as the author of 
the quest, V. recedes and withdraws from perception, enticing characters to continue 
searching in hopes that they will affirm her existence, thereby supporting their self-
perceived ontological superiority. However, due to the impossibility of ever locating the 
hyperobject in its entirety, one could assume that they are faced by not only failure, but a 
challenge to their most basic ontological assumptions. 
The Quest for the Hyperobject and Ontological Affirmation 
Stencil's quest for V. is riddled with contradiction and uncertainty as to whether 
or not V. exists at all. In a moment of dejection, Stencil thinks that V. may be nothing at 
all, "Its particular shape governed only by the surface accidents of history at the time" 
(164). Stencil's sentiment is one often raised when thinking about hyperobjects. Stencil's 
statement-removed from the context of the novel-could double as an attempted 
argument against the existence of global warming: global warming can't be pointed to, so 
perhaps the "proof' of its existence is merely circumstantial; or, ifl can hold a snowball 
in my hand on the Senate floor, then global warming is a liberal fantasy. 5 Like any 
5 This, as evidenced, when Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.) "disproved" climate change by holding a snowball on 
the senate floor. 
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hyperobject, V. straddles the fine line between perceptibly real and unreal. Morton writes, 
"Hyperobjects are so huge and so long-lasting, compared with humans, that they 
obviously seem both vivid and slightly unreal, for exactly the same reasons" (emphasis 
in original, 128). Hyperobjects are so foreign in relation to the human experience that 
they are not easy to conceptualize in terms of reality. Thus, the result of an awareness 
towards the hyperobject's existence-among them, re-thinking assumed ontological 
taxonomies-causes suspicion of both the hyperobject's reality and unreality. V.'s 
existence is questioned for the same reason; she is unable to be seen in her entirety. 
In a more general sense, the ability of V. to raise ontological anxieties within the 
characters is in itself a sign of the hyperobject. Morton describes becoming aware of the 
hyperobject as a surreal experience, akin to "finding yourself in a David Lynch movie in 
which it becomes increasingly uncertain whether you are dreaming or awake" (153). One 
way in which such defamiliarization occurs is in a heightened awareness to ontology 
itself, or the "being" found in unfamiliar places. Morton writes that becoming aware of 
global warming entails ontological awareness: "We coexist with human lifeforms, 
nonhuman lifeforms, and non-lifeforms, on the insides of a series of gigantic entities with 
whom we also coexist: the ecosystem, biosphere, climate, planet, Solar System" (128). In 
other words, assumptions of ontological superiority are thrown into uncertainty in the 
wake of the hyperobject. An awareness of the hyperobject's interobjectivity will itself 
cause one to see the endless chain of how human and nonhuman agents constantly collide 
and affect each other. Each part of the hyperobject demands seeing outside of one's 
delusional ontological superiority, as is the case with Stencil and with Profane. In an 
ominous journal entry from Stencil's father, he writes, "There is more behind and inside 
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V. than any of us had suspected. Not who, but what: what is she. God grant that I may 
never be called upon to write the answer, either here or in any official report" ( 49). The 
answer to his question would likely correlate to answering assumptions concerning his 
ontic assumptions, revealing a world in which the animate and inanimate share 
ontological footing and agency; thus, Herbert Stencil comes to an indirect conclusion on 
the existence of a flat ontology. 
The shaking of ontological assumptions directly correlates to V. 's temporal 
undulation, or the ability of the hyperobject to highlight the endless chain of effects 
moving to and from observer and hyperobject. Or, as Levi Bryant puts it, "We produce 
effects in the water (i.e., the hyperobject) like diffraction patterns, causing it to ripple in 
particular ways, and it produces effects in us, causing our skin to get goosebumps" 
("Hyperobjects and OOO"). Our perception of a hyperobject is invariably bound to those 
"ripples" of experience caused by our awareness of its presence. Bryant poses a relational 
view of the hyperobject, at least in that temporal undulation acknowledges the role that 
human actors (along with any other actor) play in the hyperobject. Of course, the opposite 
is equally true. Just as global warming is shaped by humans, it also shapes human lives. 
In the same way, V. is also shaped or affected by those who seek her. 
The manner by which the characters ultimately shape V. is primarily one of 
reduction. The characters atomize her massive, looming presence into constituent parts, 
and in turn suspecting these individual parts of containing the whole. Joseph Fahy 
summarizes the characters' options when determining the identity ofV.: "[V.] may be a 
nation, a sewer rat, Victoria Wren, Vera Meroving, Veronica Manganese, or a sailing 
vessel" (5). Interestingly, he concludes, "such matters are open to various levels of 
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interpretation, as critics have suggested." While it seems like a fairly obvious statement, I 
believe it does some injustice to Pynchon's depiction of V. while also reflecting a 
somewhat limited viewpoint offered through an epistemological stance. Oftentimes, 
Pynchon scholarship suggests that V. is either unreal or one of the possible identities 
Pynchon lays out. However, I argue that V. is all of these "identities" in a way that 
supersedes the somewhat tidy conclusion that she is unified as nothing more than a 
general V. "concept." Ontologically speaking, V., as a hyperobject, is not confined to a 
single sewer rat or a girl in the ruins of Malta; V. can be all of these manifestations. My 
explanation ofV.'s identity has not previously been afforded, most likely because of the 
seeming absurdity/impossibility of the statement that V. is all of these identities in a way 
that supersedes metaphor and symbol. Yet the possible connotation of absurdity is bound 
to the long-running Western epistemological tradition that associates "being" as 
centralized largely to the perceiving self. In the theory of the hyperobect, V. can very 
much be de-centralized into various identities. 
Dwight Eddins makes a decidedly similar claim, though for much different 
reasons and in the direction of a far different conclusion. To Eddins, V.'s dispersion into 
splintering identities marks an "existential interpretation" ( 51 ). V. is unified, he states, as 
"a goddess-shaped emptiness, an oddly negative divinity that serves as the genius of a 
historical process driven by randomly, antiseptically neutral forces" ( 51 ). Eddins notes 
perhaps the most identifiable feature of V. as a hyperobject-the strange presence of her 
absence, the shape of her negative impression throughout the novel. However, Eddins 
notes that her "emptiness" in its final form amounts to nothing more than symbolism. I 
advocate for a similar reading, though with the amendment that V. does not amount to 
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mere symbolism. Eddins' observation that V. is not one of the identities, but all of them 
is tied to his interpretation ofV. as a "goddess." To Eddins, V.'s ability to be all of these 
identities is similar in effect to the trinity-a divine agency, embodying all identities 
singularly and at once. While his interpretation is helpful in conceptualizing the 
hyperobject's agency, the trinity concept should by no means be mistaken as synonymous 
with the hyperobject. 
Though the hyperobject may consist of multiple "bodies" (e.g., global warming 
consisting of acid rain, chemicals in the atmosphere, methane gas, etc.), it does not 
embody itself into each of these bodies fully (in the manner of the trinity). For example, 
the entire essence of global warming is not to be found in a rainstorm. Instead, OOO 
sides with quantum theory in suggesting that objects possess no properties intrinsic to 
them: "Instead, each object should be regarded as something containing only 
incompletely defined potentialities that are developed when an object interacts with an 
appropriate system" (Bohm 139). Morton argues that hyperobjects are fully capable of 
uniting objects into such a system: "they [hyperobjects] can be detected in a space that 
consists of interrelationships between aesthetic properties of objects" (Morton 1 ). 
However, Morton is also careful to clarify that the hyperobject is not just an assemblage 
of other objects; it is also an object unto itself that continues to exist beyond the physical 
capacities of humans in a higher dimension. However, its affects on other objects are 
oftentimes visible, which is precisely what V. accomplishes. Although V. exists beyond 
the characters' perceptions, the identities of V. throughout the novel are physical 
manifestations of the hyperobject whose entirety is inherently inaccessible. 
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As Stencil combs through old records and testimonies, he fluctuates from 
certainty to uncertainty as to whom V. really is, stuck on the notion that V. must be one 
of these identities. For a moment, he suspects Victoria Wren-a dancer turned prostitute. 
As he looks at his dossier on her, "Victoria was gradually replaced by V." (456). It's a 
common scenario for a Pynchon character-siphoning a massive amount of information 
(some of which is undoubtedly a red herring), tracing the clues to a single something. The 
characters' paranoia, it seems, is only ameliorated by having something to point to. In 
doing so, however, Stencil ignores the ominous journal entry from his father that reads, 
"There is more behind and inside V. than any of us had suspected" (49), which is 
precisely the nature of the hyperobject. It is able to hold together multiple objects, all the 
while remaining more expansive than can be anticipated. Morton offers an analogy in 
understanding the odd, indeed paradoxical, characteristic. He compares the hyperobject 
to the Tardis of BBC's Dr. Who, which is essentially "a time traveling spaceship that is 
bigger on the inside than it is on the outside" (Morton 79). He elucidates his comparison: 
"If it is the case that an entity has more parts than it can encompass in a whole, then 
objects are transfinite in some sense, fractals that contain more of themselves than they 
let on on the outside" (79). Thus, V. as the novel's hyperobject is not contained to one 
identity over the other, much as the reading performed by Kupsch and other scholars 
suggests. Instead, V., much like Walt Whitman's grandiose self-characterization, is large 
and contains multitudes. 
As a whole, the novel grapples with assumptions concerning the nature of objects 
by introducing a hyperobject that threatens a false sense of ontological superiority 
through exemplifying tenets of a flat ontology. V. is an assemblage of the animate and 
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the inanimate; the animate in no way assumes more agency than the inanimate: Vera 
Mondaugen is no more V. than is the sewer rat. These very real identities operating 
beneath the agency ofV., embodying the notion of flat ontology, are skeptically noted in 
Stencil's musings: 
To go along assuming that Victoria the girl tourist and Veronica the sewer 
rat were one and the same V. was not at all to bring up any 
metempsychosis; only to affirm that his quarry fitted in with The Big One, 
the century's master cabal [ ... ] If she was a historical fact then she 
continued active today and at the moment, because the ultimate Plot 
Which Has No Name was as yet unrealized, though V. might be no more a 
she than a sailing vessel or a nation. (244) 
On some level, Stencil is aware of the possibility that V. is an assemblage of various 
identities, yet at the same time, he seems incredibly hesitant in his conclusion, as 
demonstrated by the final line of the passage in which he decisively offsets his 
conclusion. His frustration is likely due to an assumed ontological significance inherent 
in a human being that is absent in an inanimate object. His ontic prejudice that does not 
allow him to see that the hyperobject truly does extend beyond the human and into the 
inanimate world; moreover, it does so in an ontologically egalitarian manner in tandem 
with a flat ontology, no single component containing more ontological "weight" than 
another. In other words, Stencil can't accept the inherent withdrawnness of the 
hyperobject made up of these identities because he feels that he must find all of V. in a 
single one of these identities. The impossibility of such a task, in essence, is his true 
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"quarry"-the impossible task of distilling the entire hyperobject into one component of 
itself. 
V. forces the characters into a position where they either seek without ever 
coming near or confront the agency of the inanimate as well as the feminine. Were the 
characters to acknowledge that V. 's identities-animate and inanimate both-were 
interobjective components of a larger hyperobject, the search could perhaps come closer 
(though, of course, never leading to the hyperobject in its entirety) because in doing so 
they would at least realize the futility of their myopic approach. Yet, as seen in the 
previous quote about Stencil and his wariness to assume that they are all related to V., the 
characters are mostly unable to surmount their ontic prejudice. When a character asks 
Oedipa Mass of The Crying of Lot 49 if she has considered whether or not her situation is 
simply an elaborate hoax, the narrator writes, "It had occurred to her. But like the thought 
that someday she would have to die, Oedipa had been steadfastly refusing to look at that 
possibility directly" (138). The same logic applies to Stencil and to Profane: They both 
refuse to look directly at the possibility of a universe in which the inanimate is not 
passive and the animate loses ontological superiority. Were they to look at the distinct 
possibility of a de-centered animate, they would need to question, in the words of Jane 
Bennett, their "larger faith in the uniqueness of humans" (108), which to both is also 
related, as discussed, to their concepts of masculinity. Thus, in some ways, their central 
dilemma is one of retaining basic understandings of "self." Confronting V. fully would 
mean confronting basic assumptions of "being" that V. would inevitably shatter. Thus, 
Stencil understands that what awaits him at the end of his quest is death. As his father 
mysteriously died after seeking V., Stencil equates V. with "foretastes of Armageddon" 
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(164), a characterization which, though hyperbolic in nature, underlines the unnamed and 
unspecified apprehension he has towards V. And, paradoxically, a latent sense of death 
proves tantalizing enough to continue searching, as discussed before. It is clear that 
hyperobjects are, indeed, "contradictory beasts" (Morton 47). 
The only way to really think of V. is to think of the various identities throughout 
the novel, giving each an equal ontological weight as agents unified through the 
hyperobject. Because ofhyperobjects' ability to unify elements, animate and inanimate 
alike, they "humiliate the human, decisively decentering us from a place of pampered 
privilege in the scheme of things" (Morton 47). No longer is the human the ontological 
capstone in an expansive taxonomy of things; instead, hyperobjects level these 
taxonomies through revealing the agency and withdrawnness of nonhuman life. When the 
characters seek V., they only find themselves farther and farther away from her, 
upholding evidence of a flat ontology: "The more we know about an object, the stranger 
it becomes" (Morton 175). In their ability to demonstrate the withdrawnness/strangeness 
of all things, hyperobjects reveal an ontological semblance in all things: everything-
animate and inanimate-withdraws and becomes stranger the more it becomes "known." 
As a harbinger of a flat ontology, V.'s "decentering" of the characters from their 
ontological statuses confronts the characters' assumptions that femininity is inherently 
tied to passivity and inanimateness while masculinity is tied to agency and the animate. 
In sum, V.'s presence at the heart of the novel throws ontological assumptions into utter 
disarray. 
The understanding ofV. as a hyperobject demands a new reading for the novel. 
As mentioned earlier, scholars have widely declared that the novel's theme is "of the 
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running-down of all animate things" (Lense 60), or "the decline of the animate into the 
inanimate" (Mendeslon 6). However, I suggest that the movement of the novel is not 
from animate to inanimate; instead, the entire novel consists of the characters gradually 
becoming aware of the agency of the inanimate-a steady realization of a flat ontology. 
What they had previously mistaken as passivity is actually a withdrawn agency inherent 
in all objects. Scholars who suggest the novel embodies "decline" reach their conclusion 
from a correlationist standpoint, ironically paralleling Profane's association of 
inanimateness with passivity. Such an understanding is directly contradicted in light of 
V.'s agency. Though never found, V. is dispersed through (though is not limited to) the 
various identities because these identities are interpolated through the hyperobject' s 
effect of interobjectivity. Though unified through V., the individual identities do not 
contain the whole essence of the hyperobject, as the hyperobject's essence is distributed 
beyond human perception. What is fully available to the character's perception is a 
lingering, morbid awareness-a morbidity that is inseparable from V. 's invasive presence 
in an anthropocentric (and largely misogynistic) world. In this way, V. demonstrates that 
not only does the hyperobject promise to far outlast human life, but it also shows that 
human life is perhaps no more "special" than any other unknowable, forever withdrawn 
life. 
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Conclusion: Pynchon's Postmodern Hope 
I would of course argue against the claim that Pynchon's work is in any way 
formulaic; however, there is undoubtedly a foundation on which each of his novels 
builds: someone seeks after something that may or may not be there. The common strain 
in all the novels, I feel, must in some way be responsible for the literary impact of 
Thomas Pynchon on the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Perhaps the reason why his 
work resonates so deeply with our postmodern sensibilities is because it provides a mirror 
to these very same sensibilities. His novels offer reflections of characters dealing with 
exaggerated situations of our own, many of which reduce to the question, "Is there a 
reality that extends beyond ourselves?" 
Pynchon scholars have been quick to deal with the characters' epistemological 
inquiries, which has proven interesting, but evident in the scholarship on Pynchon is a 
lack of explicit ontological perspective, which could be argued as a powerful ontological 
sentiment in and of itself; Timothy Morton writes, "the refusal to get ontological is 
already ontological" ( 46) because the refusal demonstrates a dismissive attitude towards 
questions of "being" under the assumption, perhaps, that such questions are of lesser 
importance. The trivializing sentiment towards ontological inquiry (particularly any 
ontological inquiry dealing with our capacity to "know" the reality outside ourselves) can 
be applied to Pynchon scholarship and postmodernity in general. In its valorization of 
epistemology and epistemology's "promise" of a possibly illusory reality, postmodern 
thought has revealed an ontological state of uncertainty, which I believe has been 
reflected quite perfectly in Pynchon's work. Pynchon's novels demonstrate a world that 
finds ephemeral comfort in the possibility of unreality, but which later causes the 
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characters deep concern when they relate the question to their state of "being," as perhaps 
demonstrated best in Gravity's Rainbow when Blicero, the commander of the original 
Rocket battery discusses a possible chance to live on the Moon: "[P]resence back on 
Earth is only temporary, and never 'real' ... passages out there are dangerous, chances of 
falling so shining and deep .... Gravity rules all the way out to the cold sphere, there is 
always the danger of falling" (emphasis in original, 624). In a single sentence, Blicero 
hints at an illusory reality, while simultaneously acknowledging a very real outside world 
that holds massive sway over the individual. 
The epistemological anxiety faced by Pynchon's characters (caused by confusion 
about reality vs. illusions of reality) is also, in the vein of Morton's statement, an 
ontological anxiety. The anxiety that all reality is an illusion doubles as an anxiety that 
one's sense of being is also illusory. Conversely, one can associate the anxiety that there 
are real things that extend beyond oneself with the anxiety that the individual is 
inextricably linked to outside factors (as is the case of Slothrop in Gravity's Rainbow). 
Regardless of their apprehension, the characters are inexplicably motivated to engage in 
the quest for the central entities-the Rocket and V. As I have noted throughout the 
previous chapters, the characters' motivation to search has been a central talking point in 
Pynchon scholarship. David Cowart discusses the parallel between Pynchon's motif of 
entropy and the characters' motivation to quest after something in an increasingly 
unfamiliar world: 
[Pynchon] uses entropy as a paradigm of the snowballing deterioration of the 
West. ... [O]ne might be able to arrest or reverse the decline of a seemingly 
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moribund culture. Some such meliorism does in fact seem to motivate a few of 
Pynchon's characters-and, I would argue, Pynchon himself. (2-3) 
The characters seek desperately to retain some concept of "world" as they know it; 
moreover, the retention of "world" relates also to halting the movement of the broad 
culture into entropy. Cowart may be inclined to suggest that the characters wish to do so 
in order to preserve some familiar concept that is steadily falling away. Elaine Safer 
states as much in regards to Oedipa Maas of The Crying of Lot 49: "Characters search 
vainly for some form of order as a means of self-preservation .... In [Lot 49], the quest 
of Oedipa Maas is ... a means of defining the self' (283,287). Oedipa's situation is also 
the case for Slothrop, Stencil, and Benny Profane. They are all put into a situation in 
which the result of their quest will have a deep impact on how exactly they go about 
defining "self." Ironically, what they seek are hyperobjects, incapable of ever being 
found, thus damning their efforts. In their effort to retain their sense of "world," their 
reality is drastically changed through the hyperobjects. 
For Slothrop, finding the Rocket means that his "self' is capable of acting beneath 
the promise of autonomy, unaffected by unseen forces and connections that tie him to 
various factions and martial movements. For Benny Profane and Stencil, finding V. 
entails a reification of the animate's ability to conquer the inanimate, thus reaffirming 
their ontic prejudice and agency. In their inability to locate the hyperobject, their entire 
concept of "world" is shaken. In their failure to find that after which they quest, the 
characters must come to terms with a changing world, one in which their most basic 
assumptions about existence are thrown into flux. The hyperobjects demand that the 
characters re-think the very fabric of the world that they move through, a world 
Martinson 77 
containing massively dispersed entities whose influence one cansee everywhere, yet the 
entity itself is forever unavailable in its entirety to human perception. It is here that the 
novels intersect with our own world. Within a postmodem society that often approaches 
frameworks ofreality skeptically, to confont the possibility of an entity that, in some 
way, connects individuals through its presence and displays enormous nonhuman 
influence, dramatically complicates such skepticism. What are the implications of its 
slightly "malevolent" reality-to use Morton's word-to our own assumptions of what it 
means to "be" in the world? 
When I suggest that parallel of Pynchon's novels and our postmodem 
sensibilities, I'm following the conclusion of many other scholars, such as Dwight Eddins 
and Molly Hite. However, what I would like to add onto the previous understanding is 
that Pynchon offers hope. Most scholars would suggest that Pynchon's novels act merely 
as representations-mirrors of postmodern society. But I think that Pynchon goes one 
step further and offers some sense of amelioration. 
Before delving fully into Pynchon's "postmodem hope," it will be necessary to 
break down the parallel at work. To suggest that Pynchon's novels, in some way, reflect 
the post-war/postmodern world would implicitly suggest that the characters confront a set 
of circumstances that mirror our own. At its core, I believe the set of circumstances is 
quite simple: there are many elaborate illusions, byproducts of an entropic universe, or 
there really are mysterious, unseen entities which precipitate events. Of course, I claim 
Pynchon suggests that there are real things in the world as opposed to all things being 
illusory; there are real things that supersede human perception; there are real things that 
carry an enormous influence on our lives and over the future. I do believe, however, that 
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Pynchon does not stop by mirroring the ontological anxieties of his post-war 
generation-the fear of connections (Chapter 1), the fear of humans declining into 
inanimateness (Chapter 2), and the fear of something not readily observed or 
comprehended (Chapters 1 and 2). Instead, he offers a single, unifying entity able to 
embody all of these anxieties while simultaneously mirroring questions of real or unreal: 
the hyperobject. 
The theoretical concept ofhyperobjects, when applied to Pynchon's novels, 
demonstrates that the search for absolute truth and reality is doomed from the beginning. 
Locating the central entities in massively dispersed affairs is impossible. Yet the 
impossibility of locating the central entity is not affirmation of the insolvable dichotomy 
between reality and illusion, nor does it nullify an ontological reading. In fact, it is just 
the opposite. Hyperobjects alone presents an ontology in which "being" is radically re-
conceptualized-a "being" that is recognized in its past and its effects, never the whole 
presence, which is beyond human perception. The novels of Pynchon reveal that the 
hyperobject is a major component of the plot; however, more than a fixed device of 
"plot," the hyperobject is also an active force within the novels. 
Consider the famous opening passage of Gravity's Rainbow: "A screaming comes 
across the sky" in reference, of course, to the movement of a Rocket. The conclusion is 
set in a movie theatre as a V-2 Rocket drops onto the crowd, ostensibly while the same 
screaming comes across the very same sky. Thus, the novel begins and ends with the 
Rocket. There is no better representation of the hyperobject: the actions and plots born 
from the hyperobject will also end with the hyperobject. Timothy Morton ominously 
declares that hyperobjects, due to their sheer longevity, are what have brought about the 
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end of the world as we know it. Though their existence is often mistaken as having an 
exact beginning, their introduction into our world-not only physically (e.g., the creation 
of global warming), but also through general awareness-places them at the center of 
their very own narrative. While humans may be engaged with the hyperobject, their 
participation in the narrative will not change the outcome: the hyperobject will outlast the 
human. Morton would suggest that it does more than simply exist at the heart of a 
narrative; the hyperobject will become increasingly primary in human discourse: 
Nonhuman beings are responsible for the next moment of human history and 
thinking .... The reality is that hyperobjects were already here, and slowly but 
surely we understood what they were already saying. They contacted us. 
Hyperobjects profoundly change how we think about any object. ... Heidegger 
said that only a god can save us now. As we find ourselves waking up within a 
series of gigantic objects, we realize that he forgot to add: We just don't know 
what sort of god. (emphasis in original, Morton 201) 
The hyperobjects, viscous and powerful, impose themselves in a manner contingent upon 
the degree to which we seek after them-one of the prominent features discussed 
throughout the previous chapters. But this characteristic is really only one aspect of their 
being. In the previous passage, Morton implies a saving-power behind hyperobjects, 
aligned with an agency of the divine, suggestive of some kind of redemptive power. But 
the question remains: Who will be saved? 
Perhaps Pynchon's hyperobjects serve not just to mirror a generation of people 
who would rather not be connected to each other and would rather remain at the top of an 
ontological taxonomy. Perhaps hyperobjects act, in some capacity, as a "god" that can 
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save the characters. However, the way in which they save is clearly not through the 
typical understanding that implies preservation or keeping someone out of harm's way. 
Instead, the hyperobjects of Pynchon's novels seem to do something quite different. In 
the case of Gravity's Rainbow and V, the central entities perform eerily similar functions. 
The fears of the characters who seek after the central entities are wholly affirmed by their 
corresponding entities. Stencil fears death, but also-as I argue-he and Profane both 
fear finding that humans (specifically men) are anything but ontologically superior-a 
fear that V. confirms. Slothrop fears a web of connections, creating a chaotic tangle of 
motives and conspiracies that directly involves him, and his sense of being connected to 
it all is revealed as he draws further and further into the hyperobject. The saving power of 
the hyperobject is not a comforting power; it is a much more troubling one. The 
hyperobject comes forward with reaffirmations of our deep-seated ontological anxieties. 
It forces us to recognize the problematic nature of philosophical modes of thought forged 
by centuries of focusing on epistemological thought. The narrative of the hyperobject is a 
narrative of confronting ontological questions that lead to unnerving answers. Perhaps we 
are not nearly as autonomous as we thought. Perhaps we are no more ontologically 
valuable than any single object surrounding us. Perhaps-in some oblique, yet 
irrevocable way-we knew it all along. 
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